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This dissertation investigates the impact of new public management (NPM) on 
Saudi ministries’ openness. The study sample is three Saudi ministries: The Housing 
Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce. Moreover, this study 
creates the NPM Index to measure the ministries’ NPM implementations. 
Furthermore, this research uses the Public Participation Spectrum (SSP) to measure 
openness. This dissertation collects data from the sample's annual reports for 2017, 
and the main finding is that implementing NPM did not increase ministries’ openness. 
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The public sector is suffering from fiscal and effectiveness obstacles in many 
countries around the world. For more than 30 years, public administration reformation 
has been discussed frequently at the meetings of OECD countries (Bruno, 2018). To 
guide reform efforts, governments have implemented new public management (NPM) 
and governance theories.  
Numerous studies have investigated NPM and governance. Each of these 
theories either emphasizes or brings new principles and values into public 
administration. For example, both NPM and governance theories emphasize 
customer-oriented values (Klijin, 2012).  
A customer orientation changes public administrators' traditional values: 
Instead of viewing the public as clients, administrators see them as customers, 
sovereign consumers (Bryson et al. 2014; Rodrigues & Pinho, 2012). As a result, 
customer orientation encourages public organizations to focus on achieving customer 
interests, needs, and expectations (Bruno, 2018), as well as delivering appropriate and 
personalized services.  
The core customer-orientation values are openness and satisfaction, and 
openness includes responsiveness and transparency. Responsiveness refers to public 
participation in making public organization decisions. Public organizations must be 
responsive to both their employees and beneficiaries. Therefore, responsiveness 
requires empowered employees and the inclusion of beneficiaries in the planning and 
decision-making processes. Moreover, empowering beneficiaries requires public 
institutions to have regulations allowing the public to participate in decision making 
with a high level of transparency.  
Transparency means the public has the right to access public organizations' 




With full transparency, openness increases the satisfaction of both public employees 
and beneficiaries (Gadot & Meiri, 2007; Rodrigus & Pinho, 2012). Scholars have 
discussed that customer orientation incorporates democratic values (Balogun, 2001) 
because it encourages more public decision-making participation inside public 
organizations.  
Scholars have identified two main types of democracy: representative and 
participatory (Leach & Wingfield, 1999). Moreover, scholars have divided 
participatory democracy into four categories: traditional, customer-oriented, 
consultation, and deliberation (Leach & Wingfield, 1999). Therefore, customer 
orientation is considered a type of participatory democracy. Moreover, scholars found 
that participatory democracy, such as customer-oriented, emphasizes representative 
democracy (Stewart, 1995).  
Second, studies divide democracy into input and output democracy (Peters, 
2010). Input democracy, also called liberal representative democracy, focuses on 
public participation in choosing their representatives in government. Output 
democracy, called participatory democracy, involves public participation in public 
organizations making decisions. Therefore, customer orientation is considered an 
output democracy. 
Existing researches have focused on how NPM encourages democracy in 
democratic states but failed to explore if NPM motivates democratic values in non-
democratic states. Therefore, this dissertation aims to extend this investigation area by 
focusing on NPM implementation in a non-democratic state. This aspect may explain 
a new reason for differences between states in NPM implementations and impacts. 
Furthermore, little is known about NPM in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this dissertation 




The testable hypothesis is that when a non-democratic state implements NPM, 
openness, or citizen participation will not increase. In this study, the independent 
variable is NPM implementation, and openness is the dependent variable. The 
primary method for testing this hypothesis is a case study of NPM implementation 
among ministries in Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi Arabia is a non-democratic country, 
this study predicts that government ministries will ignore the openness dimension of 
NPM.  
The dissertation is a cross-sectional study because it focuses on one year, 
2017. Furthermore, the study population is 25 ministries, but the sample is three 
ministries: the Housing Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce.  
These three ministries were selected for two reasons.  First, it focused on those 
ministries that provide essential services and goods for the public. For instance, the 
Housing Ministry is responsible for all real estate transactions and issues. Most 
citizens in Saudi Arabia do not own their shelter. In 2011, the housing shortage was 
400,000 units (Al-Surf et al. 2014). Therefore, the expected housing shortage was 
around a million units (Opoku & Abdul-Muhmin, 2012). The Health Ministry is 
responsible for all health services in the country, and the Ministry of Commerce is 
responsible for state commerce and all products sold in the country (Almutairi et al. 
2015). Secondly, resource limitations for the study limited the analysis to just three 
ministries. Finally, the dissertation’s specific question becomes: In 2017, did the NPM 
implementations have a positive correlation with openness in the Housing Ministry, 
the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce in Saudi Arabia?  
Value-based reformation is an essential topic in public administration for 
many reasons. First, many scholars assert that values are essential to public 




had a soul, it would be the values (Molina, 2009). Max Weber encouraged scholars to 
focus on substantive rationality, which includes values and ethics besides technical 
tools (Hogget, 2006). Scholars, as well as practitioners, believe that public 
organizations need to change their values to improve public services and goods 
(Gadot & Meiri, 2007). Furthermore, the study of democratic values in public 
administration can promote democracy throughout the government (the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2001). Scholars assume that 
increasing focus on democratic values in public organizations will increase the 
effectiveness of public agencies (Bugaric, 2004). 
This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter two provides a theoretical 
introduction to NPM, and the chapter has ten sections. The first section compares 
bureaucracy and NPM since scholars have argued whether NPM is a new movement 
or an old movement. Studies have found some NPM tools among ancient Greeks and 
from the 16th century in Europe. The third section details the origin of NPM. Scholars 
have discussed four theories that have shaped NPM: public choice theory, principal-
agent theory, transaction cost theory, and institutional theory.  
The next section discusses the reasons why NPM became a global movement. 
There are four main factors: economic, political, external inducement, and social. 
Additionally, NPM has seven doctrines: disaggregation, competition, private-sector 
tools, efficiency, hands-on management, standards, and output. Moreover, it has four 
main tools: public-private partnership (PPP), downsizing, performance measurement, 
and delegation. NPM also incorporates three central values: responsiveness, 
accountability, and transparency. After that, this chapter outlines the relationship 
between NPM and democracy. Next, studies have shown some weaknesses in NPM. 




Chapter three considers the nature of public organizations in Saudi Arabia and 
has two main sections. The first section discusses the history of public organizations’ 
reformation in Saudi Arabia. Local and international organizations have provided 
recommendations to improve the public sector in Saudi Arabia. In the second half of 
the 20th century, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and the United Nations (UN) provided 
recommendations for the Saudi government to improve the public sector. Besides, the 
Saudi government established local public entities, such as the Institute of Public 
Administration (IPA), to improve the public sector.    
The second section focuses on the three Saudi ministries: The Housing 
Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce. Scholars have divided 
the history of the housing issues in Saudi Arabia into three stages. For instance, the 
first stage was between 1953-1974. This stage had three features: no specific public 
agency for housing, a focus on employees, and limited cities. The second stage was 
between 1974-2011. The third stage is from 2011 to the present. In this most recent 
stage, the government created the Ministry of Housing. The Ministry of Housing has 
offered many programs to solve the housing problem, such as the free-land program. 
The health system in Saudi Arabia is provided by both the public and private 
sectors. Moreover, there are three levels for the health system: primary, advance, and 
specialist. In 1950, the Saudi government established the Health Ministry (Almalki et 
al. 2011). Scholars discussed three main stages for the Health Ministry: curative, 
preventive, and regulative, and there is an overlap between these stages. Until 1978, 
the Health Ministry was focusing on curative activities.  
In 1978, the Health Ministry established primary health care (PHC) centers. 




stage aims to make the Health Ministry focusing on regulating the health system. In 
1999, the government established the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance 
(CCHI) to expand health insurance for citizens. 
The Ministry of Commerce was created in 1954 (Niblock, 2004). The Ministry 
of Commerce has a long history of combination with other ministries. For instance, in 
2003, the Saudi government combined the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
Ministry to became the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Moreover, in 2016, the 
ministry changed to be the Ministry of Commerce. In 2020, it became the Ministry of 
Commerce. 
In chapter four, the NPM implementations and openness are qualitatively 
assessed. This dissertation's data comes from the digital annual report obtained from 
either the official website for each ministry or Opendata.org. The researcher created 
the NPM Index to measure the NPM implementations for each ministry. The NPM 
Index consists of three factors: Public-Private Participation (PPP), Performance 
Measurement (PM), and private-sector tools (PST). 
The Public Participation Spectrum (PPS) was used to assess openness for the 
ministries. SSP has five levels: Inform, Consult, Involve, Collaborate, and Empower. 
The researcher designed a data collection instrument (DCI) to collect data. 
  In chapter five, the data were submitted to content analysis. Both the NPM 
Index and SSP scores calculate for each ministry. Then, the scores present in 
appendix. After that, a chart compares the ministries and shows a correlation between 
NPM and openness. Finally, the conclusion provides an overview of the dissertation’s 










The research question has two main aspects: NPM and Saudi ministries. 
Therefore, this chapter discusses NPM, which is considered one of the newer theories 
in public administration. Much of the debate over NPM has revolved around six 
topics. The first topic discusses the historical issues with NPM, and it has three main 
issues. First, scholars have argued whether NPM is a novel theory or a rediscovered 
theory. Scholars have found some NPM implementations in ancient Greek society and 
the Middle Ages (Ma, 2003). The second issue discusses the relationship between 
NPM and bureaucracy. NPM drives to fix bureaucracy problems (Hood, 1991). Third, 
scholars have argued over the origin of NPM. Many studies discuss the main two 
theories that are considered the cornerstones of NPM: new institutional economics 
and business-type managerialism (Hood, 1995).  
The second aspect discusses what NPM is. This topic is divided into three 
matters: NPM doctrine, tools, and values. Some scholars believe in one doctrine for 
NPM, such as accountability, while others expand the doctrine of NPM to seven 
doctrines (Hood, 1995). Moreover, NPM is associated with many tools. For example, 
NPM encourages public-private participation (Manzetti, 1994). Moreover, it 
emphasizes that governments use private-sector tools such as performance 
measurements. Furthermore, NPM brings new values to the public sector, such as 
customer orientation and accountability for results (Gadot & Meiri, 2008). 
The third topic debates the rise of NPM. Scholars have argued four main 
reasons for NPM’s emergence: economics, politics, external inducement, and social. 
The financial crisis and wars stressed governments to implement NPM tools such as 
privatization (Aberbach & Christensen, 2001). Moreover, rising the right-wing parties 




implement NPM (Ferlie, 2001). Also, external inducement, such as the World Bank 
and think tanks, persuaded governments to employ NPM (Burns, Krott, Sayadyan, & 
Giessen, 2017). Additionally, low public trust for public organizations motivated the 
public sector to perform NPM (Ferlie, 2017). 
Fourth, many studies have discussed how NPM has affected democracy. NPM 
does not address democracy (Christensen & Laegreid, 2011). Therefore, scholars 
discussed the impact of NPM tools on democracy. As a result, some scholars have 
found evidence that NPM encourages democracy, while others oppose this view. 
Supporters assumed that NPM creates a new type of democracy called output, or 
participatory democracy (Dunn & Miller, 2007). Opponents believed that authority 
should be in the hand of elected officials (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Therefore, 
pubic participation damages democracy. 
The fifth topic evaluates NPM, and it focuses on two issues: service quality 
and cost-cutting. NPM is assumed to increase service quality and decrease costs. 
Dixon and Hood (2016) found that after NPM implemented, public complaints 
increased about public service, which means that the service quality decreased. 
Furthermore, they found that the cost of public services, such as water distribution, 
increased because of NPM tools. 
Finally, this chapter discusses post-NPM as an alternative to NPM. Post-NPM 
supports elected officials to have more power (Christensen, 2012). Furthermore, 
institutionalism and network theories are the cornerstones of post-NPM (Frederickson 
et al. 2015).   
Historical Issues with NPM 
 This section discusses three historical aspects of NPM. First, some scholars 




First, scholars found many NPM activities in Ancient Greece and Europe (Copland & 
Godley, 1993). Opponents assumed that these activities were limited. Second, some 
scholars suggested some NPM aspects to be implemented in the public sector, such as 
using private-sector tools. Opponents discussed that these suggestions were not 
implemented in the public sector. 
New Public Management is a New or Rediscovered Theory  
Some scholars have assumed that NPM is a new movement, while others have 
believed that NPM is a rediscovered movement. NPM is thought to be a rediscovered 
movement because scholars have found many professional practices and proposals 
that implement aspects of NPM since ancient Greece (Ma, 2003).   
Ancient Greeks used tax farming to collect taxes (Adams, 2003). Tax farming 
is defined as a system that allows the highest bidder the right to collect taxes (Stella, 
1993). The winning bidder pays the bid amount for the state and keeps any additional 
money as profit. In the 16th century, many modern countries, such as England, France, 
and Spain, implemented tax farming systems (Copland & Godley, 1993).  
Ancient Greeks and other states used tax farming because tax farming is an 
efficient strategy. The government collected the taxes in advance at a low cost 
because they did not need to hire employees to collect taxes. Moreover, the states did 
not have experts in taxation. Therefore, using tax farming was the best available 
solution for governments.  
Opponents found that tax farming was not an efficient strategy because the 
governments lost three things: money, decision making, and information. For 
instance, the government received just 24% of the collected taxes (Cizakca, 1996). 
The rest went to both the tax farmer and contract guarantors. Also, the government 




to influence tax decisions (Ma, 2003). In some cases, the tax farmers controlled the 
government by managing the tax amount. Third, the tax farmers preferred to keep the 
tax-collection information secret. Therefore, the government had a lack of information 
about taxes. 
Besides, scholars have discussed power as the main disadvantage of tax 
farming. First, tax farming granted some authority to tax farmers. Some governments 
solved this problem by electing members of minority groups to be tax farmers. The 
minority groups were easy to replace because they did not have high power inside the 
state. 
In 1832, Sir Henry Parnell published On Financial Reform. In the book, 
Parnell argued that if public agencies implemented a private-sector structure, they 
would save approximately one-third of their expenditure (Bowery et al., 2017). As an 
illustration, Parnell compared two dockyards: the naval dockyards and a private 
shipbuilder. The naval dockyards had 248 shipwrights, 18 clerks, six masters of 
trades, eight supervisors, eight measurers, and 11 cabin keepers. By contrast, the 
private dockyard had 250 shipwrights, two clerks, one foreman, one measurer, and ten 
laborers. Parnell found that the private dockyard was more efficient because it had a 
lower number of employees than the Naval dockyards. Similarly, in the 1830s, 
Samuel Bentham encouraged outsourcing because it increases the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public organizations.   
In 1887, Woodrow Wilson explained that public administration was initially 
business administration, and that public administration should use private-sector 
applications. Moreover, scholars found that starting in 1905; there was a national 




(Riccucci, 2001). The accountability principle was an obstacle to implementing 
bureaucrats' empowerment. 
Scholars have used the preceding evidence to emphasize that NPM is a 
rediscovered theory. These points are lacking for two reasons: First, the provided 
evidence is limited in both implementation and geography. For instance, privatization 
by the ancient Greeks was in a single public application: tax farming. Moreover, it 
was limited to one region in the world. Second, market-orientation recommendations 
were not implemented in the 19th century. Scholars discussed market orientation as a 
theory, but no government implemented it. As a result, most scholars look to the 
1980s as the beginning of NPM.  
NPM vs. Bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy was created in the 1930s and 1940s (Osborne & Gaebier, 1992). It is 
defined as an administrative system designed to accomplish large-scale administrative 
tasks by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals (Olsen, 2006). 
Max Weber is considered the father of bureaucratic management theory, so it is also 
called Weberian. He looked to bureaucracy as an efficient mode of organizing public 
organizations (Ferlie, 2017). 
Bureaucracy is based on public interest-oriented models. Bureaucrats work to 
achieve public interest rather than their self-interests. In response, bureaucrats have 
job security and social position. The proper administration of bureaucracy is defined 
as having two aspects: the rule of law and efficiency (Dixon & Hood, 2016). The rule-
of-law aspect involves looking at bureaucrats as an instrument to implement the law 
(Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012). Bureaucrats must enforce law carefully, honestly, and 




cost. Least cost does not mean spending less overall but spending the least amount of 
money on services. 
Much previous work on bureaucracy has focused on four assumptions: self-
sufficiency, hierarchy, accountability, and procedures (De Araújo, 2001). First, 
bureaucracy requires public organizations to have self-sufficiency. For instance, each 
public organization provides its services and goods by itself. Moreover, it hires 
required employees to accomplish its task. Second, bureaucracy assumes that the 
hierarchy structure is ideal for public organizations (Homburg, 2004). The hierarchy 
structure allows high management to control the organization. Third, accountability, 
in bureaucracy theory, is a top-down process (Hupe & Hill, 2007). Elected officials 
are responsible for low public services and goods. Finally, bureaucrats should focus 
on procedures more than results.    
Scholars have discussed the many problems of bureaucracy, such as double-
bind management (Dixon & Hood, 2016). Double-bind management happens when 
bureaucrats send contradictory messages to their employees. For instance, bureaucrats 
ask for high accuracy with less time. Scholars assume that high accuracy requires 
more time, and the opposite is exact. To solve this problem, scholars have introduced 
the target-setting homeostatic method. It encourages bureaucrats to balance 
contradictory goals.         
Scholars who have discussed NPM within bureaucracy have determined that 
NPM should be used to correct bureaucracy failures (Hood, 1991). They have asserted 
that NPM is based on values that run counter to Weberian values or at least move 
away from Weberian values (Ferlie, 2017; Pollitt & Buckaert, 2011). For instance, 
public choice theory rejects public interest-oriented models. The public choice theory 




bureaucrats are looking for new tools to increase their strength and achieve private 
interests.  
Origin of NPM  
In the 1980s, NPM appeared in Anglo-Saxon countries (Christensen & Fan, 
2018). Contributions from many fields, such as political science and economics, 
created NPM (Lane, 2000). Scholars define NPM in many ways. First, NPM is the 
many techniques and strategies used to enhance public organizations' performance 
(Pfiffner, 2004). This definition rejects any theoretical basis for NPM (Dunn & 
Miller, 2007). Second, NPM has adopted market techniques that focus on increasing 
both effectiveness and efficiency (Liegl, 1998). Therefore, NPM is an umbrella term 
that describes different tools to increase the public sector's efficiency. This 
dissertation limited NPM to three main factors: public-private collaboration, private-
sector tools, and performance measurements.   
While NPM does not eliminate the old framework of public administration, it 
adds new approaches. Scholars believe that NPM rebalances some old public 
administration doctrine (Iacovino, Barsanti, & Cinquini, 2017). One representative 
example is NPM rebalancing accountability by increasing public accountability 
(Robinson, 2015).  
Scholars have discussed many roots of NPM. At the same time, there is an 
overlap between them (Hood, 1995). Some scholars have argued that NPM was born 
out of a marriage between new institutional economics and business-type 
managerialism. For instance, the new institutional economics movement was built on 
three theories: public choice, transaction cost, and principal-agent (Hood, 1991). 
Furthermore, it had four doctrines: contestability or competition, user choice, 




 Other scholars have shown that NPM came from four theoretical 
microeconomic frameworks: public choice theory, principal-agent theory, transaction 
cost theory, and institutional theory (Boston, 1991). The public choice theory, or 
public choice, is considered the basis of NPM (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Public 
choice focuses on the individual as the basic unit of analysis (Ostrom & Ostrom, 
1971). Therefore, it focuses on decision making. It has four assumptions: First, 
individuals are self-interested (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Self-interest assumes that 
each person has different preferences than others that affect his decisions. Second, 
individuals are rational. Rationality means that an individual can rank his preferences. 
The third assumption is about maximizing strategy. Each individual is looking for the 
option that provides the highest benefit. Finally, people make their choices based on 
the information that they have. These four assumptions were used to analyze 
bureaucrats' decision making. 
  The public choice theory has affected bureaucracy in many ways. First, 
bureaucrats focus on their self-interest over the public interest (Fornasier & Franklin, 
2019). Self-interest encourages public organizations to be inefficient (Silvestre et al., 
2020). For example, saving public money and decreasing taxation are not a priority 
for bureaucrats. Furthermore, self-interest opposes the central concept of bureaucracy 
that bureaucrats are neutral. Moreover, individuals prefer to act on their preferences 
and to have free choice. As a result, public choice recommends marketization and 
contracting out. 
 The second theory is the principal-agent theory, also called the agency theory. 
Agency theory produces an assumption of low trust between elected officials and 
bureaucrats (Ferlie, 2017). Namely, it assumes that the relationship between a 




contract (Boston, 2011). For instance, elected officials and bureaucrats may have 
different assumptions. Therefore, bureaucrats may shirk their responsibilities because 
they are not always observable by elected officials.  
Agency theory has two main implications in NPM: human resource 
management (HRM) systems and external oversight. For example, NPM encourages 
HRM to pay for performance, especially for senior managers. To renew a contract or 
raise a salary, managers need to achieve the key performance indicators (KPIs). A 
subcommittee on a public agency board makes the KPIs and manages contracts with 
public managers. 
Furthermore, the principal-agent theory encourages external oversight for 
political decisions about public spending (Ferlie, 2017). For example, the UK 
government created the Office for Budgetary Responsibility. Its main goal is to 
review and comment on public expenditure plans that are introduced by elected 
officials. Furthermore, the Office for Budgetary Responsibility works as an expert and 
independent organization. 
 The third theory is the transaction cost theory. While choice theory encourages 
contracting out or privatization of public services and goods to reduce costs, the 
transaction cost theory highlights that there is a cost for each choice, so bureaucrats 
should calculate those before making their decisions (Hefetz & Warner, 2007). The 
transaction cost theory provides many ways to calculate public projects' costs 
(Tolofari, 2005). For instance, some scholars focus on the total cost of each strategy. 
Others focus on the total cost for each stage of public projects. Furthermore, 
transaction cost includes administration costs (Bel & Fageda, 2006). Administration 
costs occur because in any contracting out or privatization, there is incomplete 




The fourth theory is the institutional theory. Scholars have discussed this 
theory’s many assumptions. Two assumptions are related to NPM: external 
environment and functionalism (Lammers & Garcia, 2017). First, each organization is 
influenced by and influences society (Hoque, 2005). This dynamic gives legitimacy 
and social acceptance of the institution (Lammers & Garcia, 2017). Second, 
organizations' internal rules affect employees' behavior (Newberry, 2003). These 
assumptions have significant impacts on NPM. 
Institutional theory's assumptions encourage NPM to include public 
participation and implement private-sector tools. External environment assumptions 
encouraged the social contract between public organizations and the public. 
Moreover, the theory encourages public agencies to align their values, structures, and 
operation with their society (Lammers & Garcia, 2017). The functionalism 
assumption enables public organizations to focus on their internal functions. 
Moreover, it invites public organizations to implement private-sector tools in dealing 
with employees, such as incentives, because they are more efficient than public sector 
tools. 
NPM Doctrine, Tools, and Values 
 Much of the debate over NPM has revolved around three topics: doctrine, 
tools, and values. For instance, Hood (1995) assumed that accountability is the 
doctrine of NPM. However, the work of Lorenz demonstrated that neoliberalism is the 




The doctrine of NPM 
NPM aims to answer the question of how the government delivers services. 
Therefore, scholars do not have an agreement about a specific doctrine for NPM. For 
instance, some scholars have introduced one doctrine, while others have expanded 
NPM to encompass seven doctrines. For example, Hood (1995) discussed that NPM 
has one central doctrine: accountability. NPM focused on accountability based on 
results or outputs. To achieve this goal, NPM borrowed private sector tools.  
Other scholars believe that neoliberalism is the doctrine of NPM (Fornasier & 
Franklin, 2019; Lorenz, 2012). Neoliberalism has four factors: the free market, private 
industry, management, the consumer. The free market factor encourages the 
government to eliminate all limited legislation markets. When there is no restriction 
on the market, the competition will be high. As a result, high competition encourages 
efficiency. Private companies encourage all public services to be provided by the 
private sector. The third factor is management, which emphasizes efficiency. 
Efficiency requires the private sector to work without obstacles. Fourth, neoliberalism 
encourages high transparency. High transparency is vital for consumers to implement 
their purchasing power. Furthermore, high transparency requires well-informed 
consumers.  
Other scholars have added managerialism. Managerialism brought about a 
new movement to replace administration by management in public administration  
(Aucoin, 1990). While the administration encourages bureaucracy to focus on process 
and procedure, management focuses on achieving goals. Furthermore, it promotes 
decentralization. Thereby, bureaucrats have more authority. 
Some scholars have discussed three doctrines and called the set the three Ms: 




new type of relationship between each public organization and its governmental 
suppliers: a provider-purchaser relationship. A contract controls purchasers' and 
providers' relationships. In this situation, purchasers have the power to affect the 
efficiency of providers because they have an opportunity to change providers. The 
market does not mean just privatization but also quasi-markets. In some cases, public 
organizations have limited market entry. Therefore, they need time to have many 
market entries so they can transfer to the full market principle. 
The second M is management. NPM’s slogan is that management must 
manage. The management principle aims to empower managers in public 
organizations. Scholars have advanced two main aspects: management capacity and 
management style. In management capacity, a public manager’s role shifts from the 
normal bureaucratic process to make changes. Many operational functions are 
transferred to an executive. The second aspect is the management style. Studies show 
that many management styles exist. Some public organizations implement corporate 
governance reform, which emphasizes that the public organization has a board. The 
board consists of members from outside the public organization—the board sets and 
monitors performance. 
Furthermore, the board dominates the lower managerial level. This style is 
borrowed from the private sector to include all stakeholders. Each organization has 
internal and external stakeholders (Al-Surf et al., 2013). Internal stakeholders are 
bodies that execute the organization's regulations. External stakeholders are bodies 
that are affected by the organization's regulations.      
The third M is measurement. To promote public organizations' performance, 
NPM emphasizes that performance should be measured, such as with total quality 




Furthermore, measurements give an ability to internal and external groups to oversee 
public organizations. For instance, regulators and auditors oversee public 
organizations based on their measurements (Power, 1997). Scholars have determined 
two types of measurements: proactive and reactive measurements. Proactive measures 
aim to improve the quality of services and goods. 
Conversely, reactive measurements are used to hide entity problems (Burgues 
& Matas, 2017). For example, some educational institutions focus on student 
satisfaction. At the same time, student satisfaction does not lead to the improvement 
of education (Dunn & Miller, 2007). 
Donald Kettl (2005) discussed six doctrines for NPM. The first doctrine is 
productivity. Productivity focuses on how the government produces more services at 
less cost. The public puts pressure on governments to decrease tax. Therefore, 
governments should focus on providing services at the lowest cost. 
The second doctrine is marketization. Kettl discussed two strategies for public 
organizations. First, public organizations sell their entities to the private sector, which 
is called privatization. Second, public organizations partner with nonpublic 
organizations to deliver services. Both strategies make changes in which bureaucrats 
behaviors mimic the private sector. Service orientation encourages public managers to 
include the public on improving public services and goods. Therefore, it provides 
bottom-to-top communication. Decentralization aims to increase both public 
responsiveness and effectiveness. Decentralization gives lower levels of government, 
such as local government or front-line managers, the power and authority to respond 
to the public, and improve public services and goods. The fifth doctrine is policy 




provider model to a service purchaser mode. Finally, accountability for results drives 
public organizations to focus on outputs rather than procedures.    
Other scholars have introduced seven doctrines: disaggregation, competition, 
private-sector tools, efficiency, hands-on management, standards, and output (Aucoin, 
1990; Hood, 1991; Lane, 2000). The first aspect is the disaggregation, which has two 
meanings. The first meaning is dividing each public organization into small units 
(Verschuere & Barbieri, 2009). The second meaning is decentralization (Yamamoto, 
2003). The second aspect is the competition (Ferlie & Steane, 2002). NPM aims to 
increase competition, either between public organizations or between public 
organizations and the private sector. The third aspect is using private-sector tools. 
NPM emphasizes the use of proven private-sector practices in public organizations. 
The fourth aspect is efficiency. Scholars focus on cutting costs. This aspect 
emphasizes the bottom line in public organizations by increasing labor discipline and 
decreasing job security. The fifth aspect is visible, hands-on management. Employees 
in public organizations should have an exact assignment of responsibility. Therefore, 
accountability would focus on responsibility. 
Furthermore, this aspect requires fewer procedural constraints to support 
employees’ achievement of their responsibilities. The sixth aspect is measurable 
standards. Efficiency, based on this aspect, relates to the organization’s goals. The 
sixth aspect is accountability. Scholars have discussed accountability in many ways. 
First, NPM empowers appointed managers and the public. Therefore, responsibility is 
shifted from elected officials to the public (Ferlie, 2001). Some scholars have argued 
that shifting does not affect elected officials' accountability; it just increases public 
accountability. Second, the private sector mechanism affects accountability in two 




with performance indicators for each public agency. As a result, accountability is 
linked to these goals. Second, market mechanisms motivate public agencies to have 
boards. Boards do oversight and have accountability roles. The seventh aspect is 
output. NPM requires public organizations to focus on results. One method to do that 
is using pay based on performance strategy. Implementation of NPM does not require 
the implementation of all these features (Wennstrom, 2015).  
Scholars have described other features of NPM. First, it is a politically neutral 
theory (Common, 1998). Both conservatives and social democrats apply it. For 
instance, NPM does not suggest that the private sector provides services instead of the 
public sector, but it presents a new type of management of that provision. Second, 
NPM expands the contracting-out strategy to include new areas, such as education. 
Third, the NPM theory brings new terms from the private sector to use in the public 
sector. For example, the NPM theory explains the relationship between the 
government and its employees as a principal-agent relationship. Fourth, NPM is a mix 
of public choice theory and private management. 
Governments have three types of tasks: providing goods and services, 
maintaining income, and regulating markets, and the private sector. In providing 
goods, NPM emphasizes contracting out. To do that, governments need to hire experts 
in negotiation, settlement, and execution of contracts. Therefore, the NPM requires 
that public managers look more like chief executive officers. 
NPM Tools 





Public-private partnership (PPP).  Public organizations have two types of 
partnerships: public-private partnership and public-public partnership (Silvestre et al. 
2020). This section focuses on public-private partnerships because it is a part of NPM 
and a cornerstone of this study. NPM focuses on steer, not row services (Bumgarner 
& Newswander, 2009; Dunn & Miller, 2007; Fornasier & Franklin, 2019).  
Steering can happen through PPP by either privatization or contracting-out. 
Scholars have introduced many definitions for PPPs based on its aspects. For instance, 
some scholars minimized PPP to privatization (Savas, 2000). They excluded 
contracting out from PPP. Other scholars included any type of collaboration between 
public and private entities. For instance, Manzetti (1994) defined both as the private 
sector providing public services instead of public organizations. Some studies focused 
on the financial aspect, so they defined PPP as a way for public organizations to pass 
some financial restrictions. 
PPP is different from traditional contracts in three main ways: bundle, risk, 
and structure. First, in PPP, the private sector runs all the project duties, so the private 
sector typically adopts PPP in the early stages of public projects (Asaolu & 
Agbetunde, 2014; Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). As a result, the private partner has a 
strong influence on the public project. Furthermore, PPP is more complicated, 
requiring high expertise (Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). Moreover, PPP takes a longer 
time than traditional contracts (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014). Second, in PPP, the 
private partner has a higher risk than in traditional partnerships because the private 
entity is sharing risk with the public agency (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014). Classic 
collaboration creates a high risk for public agencies, while PPP creates a high risk for 




Third, PPP is a mutual relationship, so it rejects hierarchy (Boyer et al., 2015; 
Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012). For instance, PPP requires 
decision-making equity. As a result, PPP's decision-making process is a multiway 
approach. It combines top-down and bottom-up approaches. The multiway approach 
involves empowering all stakeholders through information and authority (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2001). Furthermore, it requires a more flexible system than bureaucracy. 
The partners have the same responsibilities and rights. PPP thus makes the public 
sector more complicated. 
Scholars believe that PPPs have four essential elements: cooperation, clear 
objectives and goals, market mechanisms, and sharing of risk (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 
2014; Muhammad et al. 2016). PPP is a cooperation between either for-profit or 
nonprofit entities and public agencies. At the same time, both of them work to achieve 
clear objectives and goals. Furthermore, they implement a market mechanism in 
dealing with consumers. Besides, they share the cooperation risk. Some scholars have 
included nonprofit organizations. Others exclude them. Therefore, NPM supports a 
particular collaboration model called the public-private partnership (PPP) 
(Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). 
Moreover, PPP is not a novel governmental strategy. Theories have been 
presented about PPP before the dissemination of public choice theory. In 1938, the 
U.S. federal government created a secondary market for home mortgages. Scholars 
have determined that this was the first application of PPP (Bovaird, 2004). 
In the 1970s, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were adopted by governments 
in many states (Bovaird, 2004). Scholars vary in defining PPPs' parts. For instance, 




exclude for-profit organizations being a part of PPPs. Others have both nonprofit and 
for-profit organizations in PPPs. 
The main difference is that in contracting-out, the public entity still owns the 
service assets, while in privatization, the private sector owns the service assets 
(Domberger & Jensen, 1997). Furthermore, in contracting out, public agencies can 
control services' performance because they can change the contractors when the 
contractors do not achieve the expected result.  
PPP is considered a hybrid strategy (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014). For 
instance, PPP is a preferred strategy for two main reasons: downsizing and efficiency 
(Pack, 1987). The first reason is that PPP decreases the growth of the public sector, 
downsizing. For instance, downsizing begins with employees, and PPP supports 
public organizations to reduce their employees (Weikart, 2001). As a result, the 
expenditures of public organizations decrease. Finally, the government needs little 
money to work, which means low taxation.  
Scholars found mixed results for the impact of PPP on the public workforce. 
The United Kingdom's government decreased its proportion of employees from 29% 
in 1979 to 23% in 1991 (Ferlie, 2001). In the United States, an evaluation found that 
contracting out affected 5% of federal employees (Fernandez & Smith, 2005). Stein 
supported the notion that PPP significantly reduced public workers (1990). Other 
scholars, such as Fernandez et al., found that PPP decreased full-time public 
employees, but it increased part-time public employees (2006). Donahue claimed that 
the impact of PPP on public workers small (2002).  
The second reason is that the private sector is more efficient than the public 
sector. Therefore, privatization may increase efficiency in public goods and services. 




phenomenon that the government should be cautious about when it privatizes public 
goods and services (Manzetti, 1994).  
Scholars found three types of reasons that encouraged the public sector to 
apply PPP. The first type of reason focuses on the government level. For instance, 
governments face complex issues that they cannot solve alone (Fornasier & Franklin, 
2019). Therefore, PPP is a requirement to solve this kind of problem (Jacobs, 2000). 
Also, cost-saving becomes a priority for public organizations, and PPP is a strategy to 
achieve it (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014; Silvestre et al. 2020). The Second type is 
global institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, support and promotes PPPs 
(Jones, 1999). The global institutions encouraged the public sector to implement PPP. 
The third type focused on the head of the public organizations. The leading 
theory in this type is the revolving door theory (Maillet et al. 2019). Revolving door 
refers to employees’ changeover between the public and private sectors (Castellani & 
Dulitzky, 2017). The theory implies that the transition employees’ between the two 
industries decreases the barriers.  
Several scholars have openly questioned whether if the revolving door 
supported PPP. Mailler et al., in their study of the revolving door in Chile, found that 
the revolving door existed, but it did not affect the public managers (2019). The 
public managers were public-oriented. However, Castellani and Dulitzky studied 
public managers in Argentina (2018). They found that the revolving door supported 
privatization and private sector tools in public organizations.    
There is a global movement to support PPP. Some governments have created 
public agencies to support PPP. In 2008, Canada started Public-Private Partnership 
Canada to advocate for public agencies to use more PPP (Krawchenko & Stoney, 




(Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012). For instance, PPP supports public agencies to do their 
tasks without hiring more staff or buying equipment. 
Furthermore, PPP emphasizes governments to lower barriers to the private 
sector. Lower barriers support a government paying low prices to ensure that the 
private partner can achieve the contract's goals. The second goal is delegation. One of 
the main parts of NPM is decentralization. Therefore, the bureaucrats should have 
more authority. To have more control, politicians need to delegate most of their power 
to the bureaucrats to contract out the public service. 
Unfortunately, scholars have found that PPP has a democratic deficit 
(Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). For instance, some PPPs require high confidentiality, 
which affects transparency. Therefore, some information is not available to the public. 
For example, the Freedom of Information Act allows PPPs to provide a lower amount 
of information to the public than traditional public agencies' projects (Bovaird, 2004). 
Also, PPP is a long-term contract, so the cost is divided across many budgets. As a 
result, the PPPs' actual cost is not exact for the public. Also, some public agencies use 
PPP to pass reasonable spending restrictions. 
Furthermore, PPP decreases public responsiveness because some PPPs are not 
debatable with the public. Further, PPP does not have international accounting 
standards or comprehensive rules, which exacerbates PPP's democratic deficit 
(OECD, 2009 in Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). Besides, some researchers have found 
that leaders' opinions guide some PPPs' decisions (Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012). 
Scholars have discussed some public agencies' disadvantages when using 
PPPs, such as the information disadvantage. The private sector has more information 
than public agencies, so it has more power in negotiation (Boyer et al., 2015). Public 




bureaucrats. A study found that the public provides essential information to public 
organizations, but this information does not solve PPPs' information disadvantage 
(Boyer et al. 2015). Moreover, PPP has a problem with accountability. For instance, if 
a public service is weak, the public does not know whom to blame (Fornasier & 
Franklin, 2019). 
Saudi Arabia is no exception. For instance, public agencies implement PPPs 
because of financing limitations (Tahat, 2014). In 2011, the Saudi Crown Investment 
and Green IT Globe created a new company called DACENTEC Saudi Arabia (Tahat, 
2014). DACENTEC has the goal of improving the collaboration between public 
entities and the private sector. Furthermore, public agencies prefer a particular type of 
PPP called build-operate-transfer (BOT). In BOT, the private partner makes the 
project design and builds it for a while. After that, the private partner transfers the 
project to the public agency.   
Performance Measurements (PM). The public sector criticized because of 
inefficiency. Therefore, the public sector borrowed performance measurements from 
the private sector (Brignall & Modell, 2000). PM requires every public organization 
to have clear standards, and it has three significant impacts on the public sector: 
accountability, transparency, and efficiency. First, PM made a shift in public sector 
accountability (Kloot, 2009). For instance, bureaucracy focused on procedural 
accountability. Conversely, PM emphasized performance accountability.  
Second, PM increased public sector transparency. Scholars discussed two 
types of transparency: internal and external. Internal transparency means that the 
performance measurement informs managers about their organization's activities and 
service costs (Bruijn, 2002). On the contrary, the external transparency is that 




accountability process (Modell, 2000). Scholars discussed that PM encouraged at least 
three stakeholder groups: financial support groups, professional employees inside the 
public organizations, and the service receiver (Wisniewski & Stewart, 2004). Third, 
PM increased public organizations’ efficiency. For instance, each public organization 
can assess its performance based on these standards. 
Scholars discussed many tools for PM, such as benchmarking. In 1979, the 
Xerox Corporation applied benchmarking for the first because of the competition with 
Canon (Jackson, 2001). Magd and Curry (2003) defined benchmarking as 
management practices designed to improve the organizations’ performance in three 
main aspects: strategic, competitive, and useful tools to achieve the best value. 
Therefore, benchmarking requires comparison, either internal or external, public 
organizations (Kloot, 2009). For instance, public organizations can use benchmarking 
to compare their units or use it to measure up to other public organizations in the same 
sector. Moreover, benchmarking can use for processes, reports, and plans (Cassell et 
al. 2001). 
Benchmarking has three main steps (Magd & Curry, 2003). The first step is to 
identify the best practice in the field. Then, public leaders monitor progress. Finally, 
they review their organization to make a plan to improve their organizations. Camp 
(1989) expanded benchmarking to five steps. The first step is planning. In this step, 
the public manager determines the functions to benchmark. Furthermore, he chooses 
the target benchmark. The organization then analyzes the gap between its functions 
and the target to include reporting gaps to the organization's goals. The fourth step is 
action. The public organization improves its process to achieve the goal. Finally, the 




Many studies evaluated the benchmark, and the studies can be divided into 
two groups. The first studies group compared the public-sector and private-sector 
organizations. These studies found that the model was limited in the public sector 
(Magd & Curry, 2001). The second group discussed the impact of the benchmark on 
public organizations. They found mixed results. Ogden and Wilson investigated 12 
national health services centers and found that the centers collected data about the 
field's best practices (2000). Unfortunately, This information did not convert to a plan 
to improve the centers. Another study examined the Inland Revenue Accounts Office 
in the United Kingdom in 1999. The benchmark increased customer satisfaction to be 
7.8 out of 10 (Magd & Curry, 2001).                 
Scholars found many problems with PM in the public sector. The first problem 
is that the PM reports do not have enough information, allowing auditors to evaluate 
the public organization (Wisniewski & Stewart, 2004). In 1997, half of the local 
public entities in Scotland provided the PM reports, and half of these reports had 
incomplete information to assess managers.  
The second problem is that PM aims to inform the stakeholders., but there are 
different groups of stakeholders (Brignall & Modell, 2000). Moreover, each group 
focuses on precise information. Therefore, most public organizations fail to provide 
appropriate information for each group (Mascarenhas, 1996). 
In 2016, the Saudi government established The National Center for 
Performance Measurement (ADAA, an Arabic word means performance) (The 
National Center for Performance Measurement - Annual Report, 2018). In the same 
year, the government enforced ministries to include performance measurements for 
their annual reports. ADAA supported the ministries by offering training programs 




measurements. In 2017, 2166 public employees participated in ADAA’s training 
programs (The National Center for Performance Measurement - Annual Report, 
2018).     
Public participation. One of the main elements in NPM is being customer oriented. 
Customer orientation requires that public agencies respond to their consumers. Thus, 
the public becomes more involved and participatory with public organizations. The 
main goal for public participation is increasing effectiveness (Cheyne, 1999). Public 
involvement or participation has two types: direct and indirect involvement (Boyer, 
Slyke, & Rogers, 2015; Cheyne, 1999). Indirect involvement happens when the public 
involves selecting the elected officials. Conversely, direct involvement includes all 
public activities among public officials. This section discusses direct public 
participation because it is related to the dissertation question. 
 Scholars discussed that public participation has different perspectives based on 
the type of government. For instance, democratic countries are looking for public 
participation as apart of their political process (Linde & Karlsson, 2013). Therefore, 
there is no democracy without public participation. On the other hand, non-
democratic regimes use public participation as a tool to improve their image as a 
modern regime in front of democratic regimes (Johnson & Kolko, 2010). 
Furthermore, non-democratic regimes do not allow public participation to make any 
kind of threat to the government. Therefore, public participation in non-democratic 
countries is not to respond to public opinions but to make international legitimacy.  
Studies have shown four levels of public involvement. The first level is the 
informed level when a public agency provides information to the public (Rowe & 
Frewer, 2000). Second, some public agencies involve the public in consultation. Some 




are affected by the new policy. For example, the USA has The Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) of 1946. The APA requires most public agencies to ask for 
public comment through a notice of proposed policy published in the Federal Register 
(West, 2004). Third, a public agency includes the public to provide solutions for 
public issues. Finally, public agencies may consist of the public to exercise policy.  
Scholars have asserted that direct public involvement is required because 
public organizations face massive problems and multidimensional concerns (Ianniello 
et al. 2019). Moreover, direct public involvement has advantages, such as increasing 
the decision quality and decreasing project time. Furthermore, some public policy 
needs the public to change their attitudes and behavior (Cheyne, 1999). However, 
direct public involvement has limitations because the public lacks knowledge in some 
cases.  
 Scholars have explained many advantages of direct public involvement. First, 
direct public involvement improves the quality of decisions (Ianniello et al., 2019). 
For instance, public involvement clarifies policy goals and objectives. In some cases, 
the public provides alternative solutions. Also, the public can provide important 
information to bureaucrats. Second, public involvement decreases the cost and time. 
Including the public increases decision-making time. However, it reduces 
implementation because it eliminates public resistance. Third, public involvement 
encourages reconciliation between citizens, groups, and parties. Fourth, public 
involvement maintains legitimacy for public agencies. Fifth, it makes a civil society.      
 Direct public involvement has limitations. First, the public lacks knowledge of 
some issues (Kathlene & Martin, 1991). Scholars have discussed ameliorating this 
limitation in two ways: training programs and reachable information. Public agencies 




Chicago, Illinois, had a dysfunctional education system (Fung & Wright, 2001). In 
1988, a reformation shifted power to the public by creating the Local School Council. 
The Local School Council had 11 members: six parents, two community members, 
two teachers, and a school principal. All members were elected every two years. 
Later, the public noticed a lack of knowledge and capacity in the Local School 
Council's members. In 1995, a new law required each Local School Council member 
to attend a training program for 20 hours. Some scholars have argued that training 
programs were not enough because experts have varied opinions on most public 
issues (Laird, 1993). Moreover, scholars have suggested that public organizations 
make relevant information merely reachable. 
 The second limitation is the difficulty of agreement. The public has varied 
opinions. Therefore, accepting one opinion is complicated. This limitation also occurs 
among experts (Laird, 1993). The third limitation is the expectations. In some cases, 
the public has a different expectation than bureaucrats. For instance, when bureaucrats 
involve the public by hearing from them, the public believes that the bureaucrats are 
implementing their suggestions (Cheyne, 1999). Different expectations may lead to 
public resistance.  
Responsiveness increases public organizations' effectiveness, and 
responsiveness improves them (Aberbach & Christensen, 2005). When public 
agencies deal with the public as customers, they change from valuing collectivism to 
individualism. Some scholars believe that the new value is not because of NPM, but 
the public has already adopted it. There is a great deal of evidence for that, such as 
low voting rates and low public-party membership (Aberbach & Christensen, 2005).        
In Saudi Arabia, studies have shown mixed findings of public participation in 




relationship between the municipal council and the public in Jeddah. Both councilors 
and people had a lack of understanding of public involvement.  
Alshaikh (2019) assumed that the Arab Spring 2011 was vital for public 
participation in Saudi Arabia. The fear of revolution encourages public agencies to 
include the public in their public policy. The study analyzed the Labour Ministry. 
Based on the ministry’s report, the government responded to public opinions on social 
media. Furthermore, each ministry created a participatory management department to 
allow the public to participate in available programs. Public participation has 
increased since 2011, but it is still not obligatory for public agencies (Alshaikh, 2019). 
Simultaneously, the study found that the public even does not think that they have a 
voice. 
In another study in a different region of Saudi Arabia, the East, the researcher 
interviewed administrators on the civic, municipal council (Alsayel, 2016). The 
participants believed that the public should participate in decision making because the 
public is the beneficiary of public projects. At the same time, public workers showed 
some concerns about public participation. First, the public may assume that their 
opinions are mandatory for public employees to consider. Public employees are 
looking to the public as nonexperts, so public opinion is often ignorable. Second, 
some public officials think that public participation increases the period of projects. 
Furthermore, it increases the effort of public agencies. Conversely, some officials 
assume that public participation motivates wealthy beneficiaries to support public 
projects. 
Alsaggaf (2012) studied using social media for public participation in 
disasters. The study focused on the Jeddah flood of 2009. The research found that the 




responded to public requests. Besides, the crowd was using social media to challenge 
the official comment on some situations. 
NPM Values. 
  NPM has many fundamental values (Gadot & Meiri, 2008). For instance, 
NPM focuses on responsiveness to citizens as customers. Furthermore, NPM requires 
a high level of accountability and transparency. Moreover, NPM emphasizes 
innovation and renewal of old bureaucratic structure and processes. Finally, NPM 
stresses performance. Schein's ideas (1985) are considered the base of NPM. These 
changes called for reform of the public administration's assumptions, values, and 
norms regarding the public. 
 Scholars have compared traditional public administration values with NPM 
values. Person and Goldkuhl showed that NPM created a shift in traditional 
bureaucracy theory values (Rose & Persson, 2012). For instance, NPM changed 
legitimate authority to customer orientation. Furthermore, the rule of law became 
decentralized in NPM. NPM caused a shift away from complete adherence to rules 
toward mission and goals. Efficiency from the traditional bureaucracy changed to 
accountability for results. The effectiveness value became related to client needs. The 
equality value is transferred to focus on cost-efficiency. Legality shifted to focus on 
productivity. A focus on earning replaced the value of impartiality. The value of 
objectivity became less critical than market mechanisms. Transparency turned into 
more flexibility and discretion in NPM. Where traditional bureaucracy emphasized 
accountability in the process, NPM stresses the empowerment of street-level 
bureaucrats. The NPM pushed control from hierarchy to the community. 
 Hood (1991) introduced seven main points regarding NPM. NPM focuses on 




measurements. NPM emphasizes output control. Also, NPM disaggregates public 
sector units. NPM emphasizes competition in the public sector and implements 
private sector styles of management practice. Finally, NPM has a high discipline for 
resource use. Hood’s points show three main aspects of NPM: an attempt to reverse 
government growth, less spending and staffing through privatization, and information 
technology. 
 Osborne and Galber (1992) discussed NPM values as solutions for public 
sector problems. They introduced ten values that each government should implement. 
The first value is the catalytic government. Catalytic government focuses on 
leadership rather than service delivery. The second value is the community-owned 
government. Citizens should have power through public choice. The third value is a 
competitive government by making competition when providing services and 
products. The fourth value is mission-driven government. Mission-driven government 
is driven to improve communities instead of being driven by rules. The fifth value is 
the results-oriented government. The public sector should focus on results rather than 
on the budget. The sixth point is customer-driven government by focusing on 
achieving the needs of customers, not the public organization itself. The seventh value 
is the enterprising government that concentrates on earning more than spending. The 
eighth value is the anticipatory government. Public organizations need to focus on 
preventing more than curing. The ninth value is decentralized government, so 
governments need to transfer from the hierarchical structures to participation and 





Rise of NPM 
 Scholars assume that NPM is a general reformation (Hood, 1995). For 
instance, they have found NPM tools in most developed countries. There are four 
groups of factors contributing to the rise of NPM: economic, political, external 
inducement, and social.  
Researchers have debated three economic factors: the size of government, 
financial scarcity, and the neoliberal movement. The welfare state created a vast 
government. Furthermore, governments faced fiscal problems gradually, so they were 
looking for solutions to implement. Fortunately, the neoliberal movement provided 
some solutions for governments.  
Besides, political factors have encouraged governments to implement NPM. 
Elected officials have faced some obstacles in overseeing bureaucrats. Moreover, 
political scandals have decreased public trust in government and its branches. 
Therefore, the need for reformation was urgent. Also, political leaders in many states 
belonged to the right-wing. 
Many external entities have played critical roles in the rise of NPM. For 
instance, global organizations and aid providers have encouraged developing 
countries to improve their public sector by implementing NPM. Moreover, think tanks 
and educational institutions have enlightened policymakers about NPM. In addition, 
public institutions have hired advisors with private sector backgrounds. They have 
recommended private-sector tools to implement in the public sector. Finally, 
technological inventions have expedited the public sector’s implementation of NPM 
tools, such as decentralization and public participation. 
Moreover, studies have discussed three social factors supporting NPM: 




commonalities, such as language, made NPM easy to expand globally. Furthermore, 
public organizations were facing two main social obstacles: low public trust and quiet 
performance. NPM was provided as a solution to these problems through public 
participation and private-sector tools. 
Economic factors  
The welfare state was the dominant government system (Fornasier & Franklin, 
2019). It encouraged high intervention in the economy by the government and the 
provision of services and goods (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). The welfare state 
emphasized the many problems of public organizations. The first problem was the 
size of the government. The economy was restricted by the large public sector (Bale 
& Dale, 1998). For example, U.S. government expenditures increased from $757 to 
$1,872 per capita between 1949 and 1974 (Pack, 1987). In the 1970s, public spending 
in the UK exceeded 40% of GDP (Ferlie, 2001). As a result, scholars were looking at 
the public sector as the problem, not the solution. Therefore, governments were forced 
to reform public agencies to develop the economy. For instance, there was a 
movement to reverse government growth (Dunsire & Hood, 1989; Pack, 1987).  
Second, financial scarcity, such as economic crises and wars, encouraged 
governments to decrease expenditure (Aberbach & Christensen, 2001; Aucoin, 1990; 
Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012). 
For example, the Vietnam war increased U.S. taxes on citizens because the 
government's spending was high (Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2016). In 1990, Sweden 
implemented NPM because of their financial crisis (Ferlie, 2017).  
One of the main problems was budgetary. For instance, traditional line-item 
budgeting encourages bureaucracy to prioritize spending more than saving (Kelly & 




Second, it required bureaucracy to focus on rules. This problem was related to the 
classical system of public administration. The fiscal stresses were because of changes 
in the international economic system (Aucoin, 1990). Third, the budgetary pressures 
were a global problem. NPM introduced solutions for many of these problems. As a 
result, NPM tools were used in many countries. Besides, the fiscal stresses were in 
both local and federal governments. For example, some scholars assume that local 
governments in the United States contract out work because of budgetary pressure 
(Common, 1998). Supporters for the NPM movement have shown that NPM 
introduced tools to solve economic problems. For instance, NPM suggested 
downsizing the government through privatization (Aucoin, 1990). Furthermore, NPM 
focuses on cost-efficiency that encourages public organizations to either self-finance 
or make a profit (Lorenz, 2012).   
Classic liberalism focused on the public sector, which has an autonomy that is 
protected by law (Lorenz, 2012). On the other hand, neoliberalism emphasizes a 
limited public sector with free-market principles. These principles are antibureaucracy 
(Coccia, 2009). Both the Reagan and Thatcher governments encouraged small states 
with big markets (Lorenz, 2012). Neoliberal ideology has four doctrines: free market, 
private industry, management, and consumer. The free market leads to competition. 
The competition will lead to high efficiency for consumers and the private sector. The 
state's role is to remove all obstacles to achieve a free market. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the public and the government will be 
based on economic principles, not legal. For instance, citizens and the government are 
both shareholders. Private industry dogma encourages the private sector to provide all 
services. Management dogma focuses on efficiency. The state's job is to remove any 




dogma encourages a limited government. The role of the government is to remove 
barriers that influence consumers' purchasing power. The main factor is information. 
Opponents assumed that if NPM was based on the performance of the 
economy, NPM would be developed in countries that had poor performance (Hood, 
1995). Two studies tested the relationship between the government size and 
implementation of NPM. They found that this reason alone is not enough to explain 
the rise of NPM. Peters and Heisler (1983) analyzed OECD countries in the 1980s. 
They found that small governments, such as Japan and Turkey, showed a low rise in 
NPM. However, outsized governments showed a mixed rise of NPM. Therefore, there 
was no significant relationship between government size and the rising of NPM. 
Political factors  
Scholars have discussed four political reasons for the rise of NPM: 
accountability, power, scandal, and right-wing political control. The size and 
functions of public organizations were expanded. As a result, political accountability 
over bureaucracy became difficult. Therefore, the public reformation became required 
to create a new type of accountability (Wilenski, 1979). For instance, NPM added 
public accountability and accountability for results (Ferlie, 2001; Hoque, 2005).  
Second, bureaucrats increased their power over elected officials (Aucoin, 
1990). For instance, elected officials had limited tools to guide bureaucracy, such as 
the budget. Therefore, elected officials were looking for a reformation to decrease 
bureaucratic power. NPM decreased bureaucratic power by evolving. This issue was 
global, especially in democratic countries. For instance, many European countries that 
have parliaments had the same problem. The parliament lost a large degree of power 




angle. They assume that bureaucrats were looking to eliminate political control 
(Hood, 1995). Therefore, they used NPM tools, such as contracts.  
Third, scholars have concluded that governmental scandals, such as 
Watergate, created a negative public perception of bureaucracy (Fornasier & Franklin, 
2019; Light, 2001). As a result, governments have worked hard to implement 
reformation. After Watergate, U.S. Congress passed 30 laws to reform the 
government. 
Some studies show that right-wing politics raise NPM globally (Fornasier & 
Franklin, 2019). For example, both the US and the UK were under right-wing 
governments, under President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, respectively, that 
led the public sector reformation (Ferlie, 2001). Opponents have argued two pieces of 
evidence: First, Sweden was under left-wing politics, and it has seen a high impact of 
NPM. Second, Japan had a right-wing government, but it has a low NPM impact. 
External inducement  
External inducement happens when an external entity motivates a government 
to implement an idea or strategy (Goldman & Eliason, 2003). This factor includes the 
use of five tools: global entities, think tanks, advisors, emulation, educational 
materials, and information and communication technology (ICT).  
Global organizations, such as the World Bank, promoted NPM in many 
countries by providing it as a tool to improve the public sector (Burns, Krott, 
Sayadyan, & Giessen, 2017; Ferlie, 2017). Furthermore, many global loans and aid 
donors, such as the IMF, require deprived states to develop their public sectors by 
implementing NPM (Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012; Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; 
Robinson, 2015). The goal of international agencies is to promote transparency and 




Furthermore, many think tanks have supported public sector reformation 
(Ferlie, 2001). Besides, some governments have included advisors from the private 
sector. In the 1980s, the UK Prime Minister appointed advisors from the private 
sector, such as Sir Roy Griffiths, who was a director and deputy chairman 
of Sainsbury's (Ferlie, 2001).  The second reason is emulation. Global changes in 
public administration attract policymakers. Therefore, they emulate successful 
reforms like NPM.  
Additionally, an increase in books and academic articles discussing NPM has 
encouraged its implementation. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) in “Who Learns What 
from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature” show a fourth reason. When 
policymakers face a problem, they prefer to borrow the solution from countries that 
have already faced the same problem.  
ICT made NPM easy to implement by providing tools that affected both the 
internal processes and external relationships of public organizations (Homburg, 
2004). For instance, information technology encouraged decentralization, and it 
supported public organizations’ efforts to be more flexible (Larbi, 1999; Pfiffner, 
2004). Furthermore, information technology empowered the public with information 
and available choices (Tolofari, 2005). Moreover, ICT made NPM easy for the public 
around the world to notice. As a result, the public put pressure on policymakers to 
implement these reforms. For example, scholars have argued that elite universities 
and research institutions support the expansion of NPM by focusing on it (Ferlie et al., 
2016). 
Social factors  
Social factors include three aspects: commonalities, low public trust, and quiet 




(Pollitt, 1993). Scholars have compared the implementations of NPM in English-
speaking countries and non-English speaking countries. Their view has been that 
commonalities, such as language, could explain the expansion of public policy 
(Castles & Merrill, 1989). They found that English-speaking countries had high NPM 
implementations. 
In contrast, non-English speaking countries had low NPM implementations. 
However, these studies ignored the NPM implementations in other countries, such as 
Hong Kong (Hood, 1995). In the 1980s, Hong Kong also implemented NPM (Lam, 
1997). The second aspect is of low trust. The public has low confidence in public 
organizations (Ferlie, 2017). As a result, public organizations needed reformation to 
change public perspectives.   
The performance of public organizations was a factor in the rise of NPM. For 
example, Christopher Hood (1989) in Quo Vadis? Challenges of Public 
Administration proffers that NPM was a response to public bureaucracy's failure and 
its moral bankruptcy (Common, 1998). For instance, bureaucracy assumed public 
managers' abilities to control workers to deliver public services quickly. 
Unfortunately, this assumption failed. Therefore, NPM encouraged decentralization 
and delegation (Pfiffner, 2004). 
Some scholars disagree with the notion that NPM is an international paradigm 
for many reasons. First, NPM implementations do not eliminate bureaucracy. For 
instance, many countries around the world still use bureaucracy. Second, the reasons 
to implement NPM tools are varied. Studies have found that governments have 
different reasons to execute NPM. Third, NPM does not have a solid doctrine or form. 
Instead, NPM has doctrine with converse meanings. For example, empowerment has 




form in public organizations, so individuals have the power to affect producers. 
Otherwise, empowerment means the transfer of political power to citizens, so the 
market form is not a part of this transformation.  
Besides the converse meanings, NPM had used in many forms in different 
times and countries (Hood, 1995). For example, in the 1970s, NPM focused on 
bureaucrats' power. In the 1980s, NPM focused on customer power. Furthermore, the 
UK and Australia were driven by business-type managerialism, but New Zealand was 
driven by new institutional economics (Hood, 1991). Scholars assume that these 
converse meanings and forms have one common thing that all were against 
bureaucracy (Hood, 1995).  
Public Administration and Democracy 
 This section discusses the relationship between democracy and both public 
administration and NPM. Public administration has an essential role to either promote 
or impede democracy (Box et al., 2001; Nabatchi, 2009). For instance, public 
administration has a role in educating citizens about government. Education maintains 
and promotes democracy in society. Second, bureaucracy participates in making the 
public less engaged. Third, the new movements in public administration, NPM, and 
post-NPM, require high public engagement.     
Scholars believe that NPM does not address democratic values directly 
(Christensen & Laegreid, 2011). Therefore, scholars analyzed NPM in-depth to find 
the correlation between NPM and democratic values. Scholars have discussed three 
findings. First, NPM enhances democracy in two ways: output democracy and fire 
alarm. Studies have examined two types of democracy: input and output (also called 
participatory democracy). The input democratic model, also called representative 




their authority to the elected officials (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Elected officials 
implement their roles to direct the bureaucracy.  
Output democracy happens when there is a direct connection between the 
public and the bureaucracy. NPM makes a shift from input democracy to output 
democracy (Dunn & Miller, 2007). Moreover, the core of democracy is that the 
government is community-owned (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Therefore, 
empowering citizens encourages democracy. 
Another evidence is that public involvement increases political accountability 
by working as a fire alarm (West, 2004). For instance, the public may play an 
overseeing role to ensure that bureaucrats are responsive to elected officials. 
Therefore, NPM provides a new tool of oversight for elected officials to control 
bureaucrats and maintain democracy. 
 Second, scholars believe that NPM threatens democracy through procedural 
accountability. Democracy requires political accountability; bureaucrats are 
responsible directly and indirectly to elected officials (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; 
West, 2004). NPM provides two types of accountability: procedural and outcomes 
accountability. Procedural accountability demands bureaucrats to address public 
comments in making public policy. At the same time, outcomes accountability 
emphasizes that a bureaucrat is accountable to the agency’s outcomes. Therefore, the 
market mechanism reduces responsibility to both the elected officials and the law 
(Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012; Kelly, 1998; Terry, 1998). Market mechanism transfers 
public servants' accountability from elected officials and law to the public. 
NPM's Evaluation 
 Many studies have evaluated NPM values. NPM assumes that including 




ways. First, this assumption requires informed citizens (Box et al., 2001). This 
requirement is impossible because citizens do not have enough knowledge on every 
public issue. Furthermore, they do not have enough resources, such as time. Besides, 
some studies have found that bureaucrats prefer to contract out rather than including 
citizens. They assume that contracting out makes quality high.    
NPM also assumes an increase in the quality of public services. Therefore, 
Dixon and Hood (2016) theorized that public complaints would be lower if public 
service quality increased. So they analyzed public complaints about public services in 
the UK between 1975 and 2005. They found that public complaints had increased. 
Most complaints were about the fairness of rules and consistency of rules for the same 
cases. Some scholars criticized this study. They explained the rise occurred because 
complaint methods became more comfortable for the citizen to use. For example, new 
technology, such as the internet, made complaints easier. Therefore, the increase in 
complaints was not because of NPM. Dixon and Hood refuted this critique. The 
increase was not in all public organizations. Thus, the increase was not because of the 
ease of complaints but because of the decrease in public service quality. 
 Dixon and Hood further discussed cost-cutting in NPM. They analyzed the 
running cost for both the UK civil department and general administration costs for 
local governments between 1980 and 2011. Running cost included the organization's 
regular expenditure, such as human resources, utilities, and rent. In the UK, the 
running cost is considered an essential element of treasury control. They found this 
increased by almost double. They analyzed the increase and found that the number of 
public servants decreased by one third, but the wage expenditures were the same. 
Therefore, public servants' wages were increasing more than the rate of inflation. The 




analyzed two public functions: water distribution and waste collection. They found 
there was not any cost-saving for these areas.      
Post-New Public Management 
 Criticisms of the NPM theory include concerns over elements such as 
efficiency and the low quality of public service. As a result, scholars have supported a 
new reform called post-new public management. Critics maintain that the NPM has 
several limitations. First, NPM decreases the political control among bureaucrats 
(Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000) and has said that high self-control or decentralization does 
not fit democratic practices. For instance, Zanetti and Adams (2000) believe that 
implementing market values in public organizations under a democratic regime would 
damage democracy and prevent market control. The result is fragmented public 
organizations that put more pressure on bureaucrats to manage and increase their 
capacity. Second, global issues, such as terrorism and economic crises, grew the 
desire to centralize a system for public organizations (Hammond, 2007; Ventriss, 
2013). 
 Post-NPM has four associated doctrines. First, post-NPM increases political 
domination among bureaucrats. For instance, post-NPM increases the capacity at the 
top levels. The second doctrine is governance (Reiter & Klenk, 2018). Governance 
introduces a broad picture for the public sector by linking the public sector with all 
institutions that affect it, such as political and social environments (Kettl, 2002). The 
third doctrine emphasizes the relationship between public organizations and service to 
the public. The fourth doctrine is performance (Reiter & Klenk, 2018). 
 Two main theories have shaped post-NPM: institutionalism and networks 
(Frederickson, Kevin, Christ, & Licari, 2015). Institutionalism focuses on collective 




these organizations work together with a mix of conflicts, interests, and competition. 
Network management has three main perspectives (Hwang & Moon, 2008). The first 
perspective is interest intermediation, which assumes that organizations can find a 
common goal when they work together. The second perspective is being a 
government tool, as network management supports the government in implementing 
policies. The third perspective is information; network management endorses the 




Chapter Three  






This chapter discusses four main aspects. First, it discusses the reformation 
history of public organizations in Saudi Arabia. Local and global organizations have 
provided recommendations to improve the public sector in Saudi Arabia (Dobe, 
2008). The other three aspects discuss the dissertation’s sample: the Housing 
Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Commerce Ministry.  
The housing issue in Saudi Arabia has three stages. The first stage was 
between 1953-1974. This stage had two features. First, there was no agency 
responsible for housing. Second, public housing projects were focused on employees 
and in limited cities (Saleh, 1998). The second stage was between 1974 and 2011. The 
government established three agencies to accelerate the building of houses: the Real 
Estate Development Fund (REDF), the Ministry of Public Works and Housing 
(MPWH), and the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) (Al-Mayouf & 
Al-Khayyal, 2011). REDF provided free-interest loans for citizens to build their 
houses. MPWH offered ready units. MPMRA afforded free land to citizens (Alasmari, 
2018).  
The third stage has been from 2011 until the current day. In 2011, the 
government created the Housing Ministry (Kyriazis et al. 2018). The Housing 
Ministry provided many projects through collaboration with the private sector to 
support citizens in owning their homes. 
In 1950, the Saudi government established the Health Ministry (Khaliq, 2012). 
Studies showed that the reformation of the Health Ministry happened through three 
stages. First, the Health Ministry was focusing on curative activities. In 1978, the 
Health Ministry created primary health care (PHC) centers (Sebai et al. 2001). PHC 




ministry’s goals. In 1993, the Health Ministry worked to change its role from 
providing health care services to regulate it (Khaliq, 2012). 
The Reformation of Public Organizations in Saudi Arabia 
The government of Saudi Arabia works hard to improve public services. 
Therefore, the reformation of public administration has a long history in Saudi Arabia. 
The central aspect to discuss regarding the reformation of public organizations is 
whether the source is internal or external. For instance, the government of Saudi 
Arabia has created some public organizations to oversee and improve the public 
sector in Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) was 
designed to develop public organizations by training public employees. In the 1950s, 
the Saudi government faced a fiscal problem. It asked for financial support from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF then provided restricted support to the 
Saudi government. The Saudi government was required to make economic 
development plans and increase revenue resources (Al-Harthi, 2001).  
The first reformation plan occurred in July 1927 with the creation of the 
Commission on Inspection and Reform (Huyette, 1985). The primary goal for the 
commission was to review administrative systems and recommend reforms. This 
commission's outcomes focused on reforming the Consultative Council to have eight 
members and to meet twice weekly. Furthermore, the commission clearly defined the 
Consultative Council's tasks to include reviewing budgetary questions, new economic 
projects, expropriation of property for public utilities, enactment of laws and statutes, 
and employment of foreign nationals. In this period, the government's shape was not 
modern because there was no central body controlling public agencies (Dobe, 2008). 




In the early stages, international organizations played an essential role in 
improving public organizations because Saudis lacked education and skills (Dobe, 
2008). In 1957, the KSA faced a financial crisis, so it asked the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to study the situation and introduce some advice to solve the 
fiscal problems. The IMF made recommendations that many governments 
subsequently implemented. In 1960, the government of Saudi Arabia asked the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for help creating an 
economic plan to generate different resources of revenue instead of oil. The main 
recommendation was to establish a central public organization for planning, which 
had three primary goals: making and supervising development plans, rearranging 
public organizations, and localizing human resources. In the same year, the 
government of Saudi Arabia asked the United Nations (UN) to send a consultant to 
study the administrative situation within the country, and the expert introduced four 
recommendations. The recommendations included merging similar public 
organizations, improving the financial control system in public organizations, 
simplifying the administrative process—especially in the procurement system—and 
establishing a training center to educate public employees, which eventually became 
the Institute of Public Administration (IPA).  
The History of the Housing Issue in Saudi Arabia 
In 1938, oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia (Hitti & Abed, 1974). The 
discovery improved the country's economy. Furthermore, it encouraged the 
government to make a modern society by building modern cities. This section focuses 
on the history of housing solutions in Saudi Arabia. Scholars have discussed them 




The first stage was between 1953-1974. This stage had three features: no 
specific public agency for housing, a focus on employees, and limited cities. The 
second stage was between 1974-2011. The third stage is from 2011 to the present. In 
this stage, the government created a ministry for housing. The government offered 
three ways to solve the housing problem: building houses, zero-interest loans, and free 
land.  
The first stage (1953-1974)  
The first stage was between 1953-1974. Two factors encouraged the 
government to intervene in housing issues: discovering oil and immigration to urban 
areas. Finding oil supported the economy. For instance, government revenue 
increased from $334 million in 1960 to $4.216 billion in 1973. Besides, there was a 
boost in populations of urban areas (Saleh, 1998). Between 1950 and 1974, Riyadh's 
population increased from 111,000 to 651,000. 
This stage had two main housing projects: the Arabian American Oil 
Company's (ARAMCO) programs and the Al-Malaz Project. ARAMCO had a vast 
number of employees. For instance, in 1951, they numbered 22,395 (Fadan, 1983). 
The company faced a problem with shelter because the oil fields were far from the 
cities. Therefore, in 1953, the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) created 
three programs to support the housing sector (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011). The 
first program was the Home Ownership Program. The Home Ownership Program was 
a collaboration between the government and ARAMCO. The government provided 
free land for ARAMCO's employees (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011). At the same 
time, if any employee needed a loan, ARAMCO offered a Housing Loan Plan, which 
included zero-interest loans for its employees. The third program was the Guarantee 




sell its houses, ARAMCO would pay the rent for up to five years. In 1952, ARAMCO 
encouraged contractors to build 300 homes (Fadan, 1983). ARAMCO programs 
focused on oil sites in the Eastern Province (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011). 
In 1953, the Saudi government moved the ministries and offices from Jeddah 
to Riyadh. The government announced the Al-Malaz Project to build houses for 
public employees. This project had two goals. The first goal was to motivate public 
employees to transfer to Riyadh (Fadan, 1983). The second goal was to solve shelter 
scarcity. At the same time, there was no governmental agency for housing. Therefore, 
the Ministry of Finance and National Economy in cooperation created the general 
administration for housing that was responsible for this project (Mortada, 2008). 
Consequently, they hired foreign experts to do the project. The project 
included 754 detached home units and three buildings that contained 180 apartment 
units. Also, the project provided public services.  
The second stage (1974-2011) 
The second stage was between 1974 and 2011. In this stage, the government 
created three public entities to support citizens to own their homes. As a result, house 
projects expanded to include all cities and villages in the country. Furthermore, 
government spending was high. For instance, between 1975 and 1980, the 
government allocated $24 billion to build 300,000 housing units (Mubarak, 1999). In 
1974, the Saudi government created the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF; Al-
Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011; Alhubashi & Cladera, 2016). The REDF provided zero-
interest loans for the public to build their own homes. In 1975, the government 
established the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) and the Ministry of 
Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA). MOMRA launched a program to provide 




 In 1974, the Saudi government established the Real Estate Development Fund 
(REDF). It is a public agency that aims to provide interest-free loans for the public. It 
began with 250 million riyals, almost $70 million. In the same year, the government 
increased its initial capital to 9 billion riyals, or $2.4 billion. In 1990, the value of 
REDF was almost 74 billion riyals, or nearly $20 billion. The first program for REDF 
was to provide interest-free loans for citizens to build their private homes. Citizens 
would repay the loan over 25 years.  
The REDF categorized the loan amounts in three levels. The first level was 
300,000 riyals, $80,000 for major cities. The second level was 250,000 riyals, 
$66,667 for towns. The third level was 200,000 riyals, $53,333 for small villages. The 
REDF provided the loan in four installments. First, the borrower received 10% of the 
loan when he signed the agreement. Next, he/she received 40% when the concrete 
framework was done. The third installment was 40% when they finished all the 
masonry work. When the house was done, they would receive the last payment of 
10%. 
The REDF offered a 20% discount for borrowers who repaid the loan 
regularly. Furthermore, there was an additional 10% discount for borrowers who 
repaid the total loan at once. Until 1988, the REDF had supported the building of 
440,446 houses. The commitment percentage of repayment was 93%. 
In 1975, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) replaced the 
General Administration for Housing (Mortada, 2008). MPWH provided two types of 
projects: rush housing and regular housing. The ministry focused on nine major cities.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, MPWH built rush public housing projects in three 
main cities: Riyadh, Dammam, and Jeddah (Mortada, 2008). These projects were 




These projects were ready in 1980 but remained unoccupied for eleven years. The 
citizens refused to live there because the housing options were not appropriate for 
Saudi families. For instance, the size of the housing units was small, and the average 
family size was big. 
Furthermore, Saudi culture does not prefer living in apartments. In 1990-1991, 
Kuwaiti citizens used these projects as a shelter because of the Iraq War. After the 
war, the ministry gave these projects to REDF to provide them to qualified citizens. 
Besides the rush housing, MPWH built regular housing. This type focused on 
low-rise apartments and separated houses (Mortada, 2008). For instance, they were on 
one floor. The regular housing projects provided 9,934 apartments and 10,516 homes. 
In 2001, the total units were 24,540, and MPWH was brought down. 
The Third stage (2011-current) 
The third stage is from 2011 until now. In 2011, King Abdullah decreed the 
Ministry of Housing (MoH). As a result, the MoH became responsible for residential 
shelter, and it included the REDF (Kyriazis et al. 2018).  
The Ministry of Housing has 12 programs and initiatives. The main initiative 
is called Sakani, which means my home in English. This initiative aims to support 
citizens to have their own homes by providing many programs and paying entirely or 
partially the interest rate of real estate loans. It works through participation with 
financial institutions. It offers nine solutions.  
The first solution is that citizens can buy their homes directly from the market. 
Until January 2019, the ministry accepted 25,731 such requests. The second solution 
is that the citizen can build his own home with financial support from the ministry. In 




involves units under construction. The ministry agreed to 264,670 such demands until 
January 2019. 
The fourth solution is the ministry's constructed units. The fifth solution is 
converting current real estate loans to supported loans. The sixth solution is free land. 
The ministry offers free lands in some cities. These free lands are restricted to be built 
on in one year, or the citizen loses them. The ministry distributed 207,296 lands. The 
seventh solution is an additional loan for the current military. Besides 500,000 SAR, 
current military members can have 20% of their real estate value up to 140,000 SAR. 
The eighth solution is an additional loan for citizens 50 years old and above. Besides 
500,000 SAR, they can have 20% of their real estate value up to 140,000 SAR. The 
ninth solution is paying a value-added tax of up to 42,500 SAR. 
The Health System in Saudi Arabia 
 Saudi Arabia has been provided with health care services since 1926 (Khaliq, 
2012). In 1926, the government created the health directorate in Jeddah. The health 
care system was limited. It was just in Mecca and Jeddah. In 1927, the government 
changed the name to be the Directorate of General Health and Ambulances and 
expanded its authority to include the whole country (Khaliq, 2012; Ram, 2014). In 
1950, it became the Ministry of Health. In 1970, the government announced the first 
five-years national health plan (Ram, 2014).   
In 1997, the Saudi health care system ranked 26th (The World Health 
Organization, 2000; Al-Yousuf et al., 2002; Khaliq, 2012). Both the public and 
private sectors provide health care services. The public sector offers public health 
services directly and indirectly. Directly, the Health Ministry is responsible for the 
health care system. Besides, other governmental entities, such as the Education 




employees and their families (Al-Yousuf et al., 2002). In emergency cases, these 
governmental entities expand their health care services to include all citizens (Mutfi, 
2000). 
 The private sector provides health care services during private hospitals, 
clinics, and pharmacies (Al-Yousuf et al., 2002). Private health care services exist in 
big cities. The health system has three levels: primary, advance, and specialist 
(Almalki et al. 2011; Al-Yousuf et al. 2002). Primary health care (PHC) centers 
provide primary health care services. PHC system was created in 1978. If a patient 
needs advance retreatment, the doctor transferred the patient to an advanced hospital. 
Besides the advanced hospitals, there are specialized hospitals.    
The Health Ministry  
In 1950, the Saudi government created the Health Ministry to provide health 
care services directly to citizens (Almalki et al. 2011). The ministry provides vital 
health care services, approximately 60% (Al-Yousuf et al. 2002; Sebai et al. 2001; 
Ram, 2014). Furthermore, it has four other functions: making strategic health plans, 
formulating health policies, super health programs, and controlling all health activities 
(Al-Yousuf et al. 2002; Ram, 2014). The functions require a decentralized structure. 
The ministry divides the country into twenty regions (Al-Yousuf et al. 2002). 
Each area has a health director who is responsible for the health care service in the 
region. Each area has many sections.  
Scholars discussed three stages for the Health Ministry: curative, preventive, 
and regulative. The curative stage was between 1950 and 1978, and the ministry was 
focusing on therapeutic activities. There were limited preventive programs, such as a 
campaign against malaria in the eastern province in the 1950s (Al-Yousuf et al. 2002). 




Ministry (Sebai et al. 2001). Curative is necessary, but without preventive, it costs 
highly.  
In 1978, the ministry made plans to prevent diseases, such as malaria. 
Therefore, the ministry began to establish PHC centers. PHC has five main tasks. 
First, PHC is responsible for educating the public about three main issues: diseases, 
water, food. Diseases’ knowledge includes conditions and reasons. Moreover, it 
informs how the public can avoid infections. Water education includes how safe water 
is essential. The food topic discusses proper nutrition. Second, PHC centers provide 
maternal and child health care.    
Third, PHC works to increase the percent of the public who are vaccine. 
Fourth, PHC centers deal with regional pandemics. Finally, PHC provides treatment 
for common diseases. 
At the end of the 1980s, 10% of PHC activities focused on preventing diseases 
(Sebai et al. 2001). Therefore, the strategic health plan, between 1990 and 1995, 
emphasized preventative actions. In the 1990s, the number of hospital patients 
decreased by up to 40% (Sebai et al. 2001; Khoja et al. 1997). In 2009, there were 
1925 PHC centers in the country (Khaliq, 2012).  
In 2009, the Health Ministry had 2037 PHC centers, and they received 82% of 
visitors for all health providers. PHC centers contribute that each citizen has a health 
record. The health record system reduced the health care cost because it prevents the 
duplication of consultation.        
The Health Ministry budget is enormous. Between 2005 and 2009, the 
ministry’s budget average was almost 6% of the country's budget. Therefore, the 
ministry is highly costly, and it provides free health care services for the public. Thus, 




(Khaliq, 2012). This stage emphasized three main steps: health insurance, 
privatization, and electronic health services. 
In 1993, the government created the Saudi Commission for Health Specialties 
(SCHS) (Khaliq, 2012). SCHS is responsible for supervising, regulating, and 
accrediting all health training programs. Moreover, SCHS is responsible for issuing 
and renewing healthcare professionals' licenses (AlBaker et al. 2017).  
The Health Ministry stressed the co-operative health insurance system (Sebai 
et al. 2001). In 1999, the government established the Council of Cooperative Health 
Insurance (CCHI). The council aims to create, regulate, and oversee health insurance 
strategies. The council recommended a plan to have health insurance for the public, 
which became the Cooperative Health Insurance Act of 2003 (Khaliq, 20120 
 The act has three stages of implementing health insurance for the public in the 
country. The first stage focused on employees in the private sector, and the employers 
pay the cost of health insurance. The council divided this stage into three phases. The 
first phase focused on the private sector, with more than 499 employees. Second, the 
Council included companies with more than one hundred employees. Finally, all 
employees in the private sector were insured. This stage was implemented 
completely. In 2010, CCHI reported that 8.4 million insured individuals (Khaliq, 
2012).  
The second stage expands the insured employees by including the public 
sector employees, and the government pays health insurance costs. The third stage 
aims to include other groups, such as tourism.        
The ministry implemented privatization in two strategies, either sell or rent 
public hospitals, and both ways have advantages and disadvantages (Walston et al. 




expenditures on health care services. Moreover, the decision making is faster. 
Conversely, the private sector focuses on thriving cities, the main cities, so there is a 
concern about the rural areas. 
The ministry implemented electronic health services to automate all health 
services and requirements. In 2008, the ministry announced a four-year plan to 
develop electronic health care services with a $1.1 billion budget (Bah et al. 2011). As 
a result, the ministry announced many electronic systems. The first system is the 
Health Information System (HIS) (Ram, 2014). The system is comprehensive, and it 
has two goals. First, each patient should have an electronic health file. Second, each 
hospital has an electronic system, and the system connects all hospitals. The second 
system is the Bed Management System (Ram, 2014). The system manages the 
capacity of each hospital to guide referral decisions.     
Ministry of Commerce 
 In 1946, the government established the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce & 
Industry to administrate the commerce. Its goal was to protect local products. In 1954, 
the government created the Ministry of Commerce and expanded its tasks (Niblock, 
2004). In 2003, the ministry became the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. In 2016, 
the ministry changed to be the Ministry of Commerce and Investment. In 2020, it 
became the Ministry of Commerce.   
The ministry has many functions, but there are two main functions. First, it is 
accountable for checking the safety and quality of goods and products to ensure that 
they are safe for the public (Almutairi et al. 2015). Second, the ministry is responsible 
for protecting the public from fraud and deception (Almutairi et al. 2015). Some of 











As established in the first chapter, this study aims to determine if 
governmental type affects New Public Management (NPM) implementation, 
especially when a government has controversial values. For instance, the literature 
found that NPM is reliant on democratic values, such as openness. At the same time, 
non-democratic governments do not believe in democratic values. Therefore, a 
conversion happens when a non-democratic government implements NPM. Ignoring 
the NPM democratic values limits the impact of NPM, especially with respect to 
openness. This study uses openness and public participation as synonyms.   
As such, the testable hypothesis is that when a non-democratic state 
implements NPM, openness or citizen participation will not increase. There are three 
possible outcomes in the relationship between the NPM index and openness score: a 
positive relationship, a negative relationship, and no relationship. A positive 
relationship between the NPM Index and openness score would indicate that an 
increase in the NPM Index leads to an increase in openness. In this case, the 
hypothesis would be rejected. A negative relationship between the NPM Index and 
openness would indicate that an increase in the NPM Index leads to a decrease in 
openness. Should the results show no connection between the NPM Index and 
openness, the dissertation hypothesis would be accepted.    
In this study, the independent variable is NPM implementations, and openness 
is the dependent variable. The primary method for testing this hypothesis is a case 
study of NPM implementation among ministries in Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi 
Arabia is a non-democratic country, this study predicts that government ministries 




The study population consists of 25 ministries in Saudi Arabia, and the unit of 
analysis the ministerial organizations. The study is cross-sectional and uses the 
ministries’ most recent annual reports (2017) to count four things for each ministry: a 
total of public programs, PPP programs, performance measurements, and contracted 
employees. This study examines the efforts of 3 of the 25 ministries to implement 
NPM. They are the Ministry of Commerce, the Health Ministry, and the Housing 
Ministry.  
The three agencies are the sample and were selected for two reasons.  First, it 
focused on those ministries that provide essential services and goods for the public. 
For instance, the Ministry of Commerce is responsible for the state economy and all 
products sold in the country. The Health Ministry is responsible for all health services 
in the country, and the Housing Ministry is responsible for all real estate transactions 
and issues. Furthermore, these ministries provide various services so that the study 
may find various public participation. Secondly, resource limitations for the study 
limited the analysis to just three ministries. For instance, these ministries provide their 
annual reports on their websites.   
The rest of this chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section 
explains the study's three variables: the NPM implementations, openness, and the 
government type. Moreover, it describes the measurements. The NPM 
implementations were measured by creating the NPM Index. Furthermore, this 
dissertation used PPS to measure openness. This study used the Political Regime 
Index dataset provided by Our World in Data to measure the type of government. The 
second section discusses the data collection instrument. The researcher created a form 
to gather data from the ministries’ annual reports. Finally, the section shows the data 




The Variables and Measurements 
This dissertation has two main variables. The first variable is the NPM 
implementations, which is the independent variable. This variable was measured by 
the NPM Index, which focuses on three aspects: PPP, PM, and PST. The second 
variable is openness, which is the dependent variable. The researcher has permission 
from the international association for public participation to use its Public 
Participation Spectrum (PPS). The Political Regime Index was used to explain the 
kind of Saudi government. 
The NPM Implementations  
This study drew on three main qualities of NPM to create a new measure 
referred to as an NPM Index to measure the independent variable of NPM 
implementation. The first element of this index is the degree of collaboration between 
the public and private sectors, which is called Public-Private Participation (PPP). The 
second element is the degree of the shift to focus on performance measurements 
instead of procedures. In the study, this is called Performance Measurement (PM). 
The third element of the index is the degree to which a public agency implements 
private-sector tools (PST). This dissertation used an inductive approach to code the 
variable. For instance, the researcher read the annual reports for any word terms to 
PPP, such as collaboration. At the same time, the researcher went profoundly and read 
the details of each program to ensure if the program belongs to PPP or not. This index 
was used to measure NPM implementation for the three selected ministries. Each 
factor was given a score out of 100, and then the three scores were averaged. The next 
section describes this index in more detail.  
The first component of the NPM Index is government collaboration with the 




The first type occurs when the private sector collaborates with the public sector to 
provide goods or services. The second type is privatization. For this study, we are 
primarily concerned with the first type. The PPP score for each ministry is therefore 
based on the private-sector contribution to providing that ministry's primary service. 
There are three ways to measure the private-sector contribution: percentage of 
buildings, percentage of beneficiaries, and percentage of staff. The percentage of 
buildings calculates PPP based on the percentage of facilities that the private sector 
owns. The second two methods calculate PPP based on what percentage of 
beneficiaries the private sector serves and what percentage of the staff is the private 
sector, respectively.  
For example, the Health Ministry’s primary task is to provide health services. 
In Saudi Arabia, there are two main types of hospitals: public and private. Therefore, 
the PPP score can be measured based on what percentage of all hospitals are private. 
Alternatively, the ratio of beds in private hospitals versus the number of hospital beds 
total is another way to measure the PPP score. The rate of total hospital staff working 
in private hospitals is yet another alternative for measuring the PPP score. This study 
uses the ratio of beneficiaries because this allows for a standard measurement across 




The second NPM Index component is performance measurement (PM). 
Propper and Wilson (2003) have defined performance measurements in three ways: 
outputs, outcomes, or impacts, and results in linking resources and outcomes. The PM 
score for this study is based on the percentage of the organization’s programs that 
have performance measurements. The PM score was calculated by comparing the 




available programs: PM score = 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑀
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠
∗ 100. This information can be 
found in government reports because, in 2015, the Saudi government created The 
National Center for Performance Measurement (ADAA) (ADAA is an Arabic word 
means performance by English). The main goal for the ADAA was to increase public 
sector efficiency by supporting the creation of performance measurements for public 
organizations. As of 2017, each ministry is required to work with ADAA and must 
include performance measurements in their annual reports.    
The third NPM Index component measures the use of private-sector tools 
(PST) in public organizations. Scholars discussed many private-sector tools, such as 
job security and performance-related pay (Emery & Giauque, 2003). For instance, 
NPM encourages public organizations to implement the annual contract and reward 
system like the private sector. Both strategies cannot be implemented with the current 
merit system in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the first step is to have employees with an 
annual contract. Annual contract eliminates job security and allows the public sector 
to pay based on performance (Rasheed, 2018).  
The private sector offers contracted jobs while the public sector often provides 
jobs for life (through the "merit system"). However, some Saudi ministries use both 
merit and contract systems in hiring public employees. The public contract system 
implements private-sector tools through the requirements and incentives for positions. 
The contract system allows public organizations to implement private-sector tools, 






This study examined openness, which is the stand-in for the dependent 




used to quantify openness in each ministry. The International Association for Public 
Participation created this instrument, and it permitted the researcher to use it (See 
Appendix III). PPS has five levels of public participation: Inform, Consult, Involve, 
Collaborate, and Empower. Every level has more public participation than the 
previous level (Nelimarkka et al. 2014). 
The first level, Inform, indicates that the ministry provides information to the 
public about its goods and services. The second level, Consult, means that the 
ministry actively seeks public feedback. The third level, Involve, indicates a ministry 
that involves the public in their work and considers the publics' concerns. The fourth 
level, Collaboration, marks a ministry that sees the public as a partner, working 
together at each step of decision-making. The highest level, Empowerment, indicates 
that the public has the right to make decisions instead of the ministry itself (Jami & 
Walsh, 2014). 
The PPS was used to assign a value for each level. For instance, the lowest 
level, inform, was given 20 points, and 20 points were added for each higher level. 
The highest point value is 100 for the empower level. For example, if a ministry 
implemented a method categorized as being at the consult level, it counts 40 points. 
The researcher analyzed all ministries' strategies and ranked them to PPS levels based 
on each level's definition (See Appendix I).      
In this study, a Ministry receives 20 points for each level of openness 
achieved. Appendix I shows some examples for assigned values. The total points were 
divided by the total number of examples to determine the PPS level average for each 
ministry. Finally, the total points for all levels were summed and divided by the 




The Saudi Government type.  
The Political Regime Index was used to establish the current state of 
democracy in Saudi Arable. The Political Regime Index is based on data from 
Wimmer and Min (2006) and the Center for Systemic Peace and was most recently 
updated in 2015. It measures the political regime of most countries on a scale from -
10 to +10. A +10 score indicates an entirely democratic government, while a -10 
score indicates an entirely non-democratic state. Saudi Arabia scored -10 on the 
political regime scale, classifying it as a non-democratic country. This study is 
focused on non-democratic governments. Therefore, the Political Regime Index 
provided evidence that Saudi Arabia is appropriate for this study.  
Data Collection Instrument 
The researcher designed a data collection instrument (DCI) to parse the large 
amount of information provided by each ministries' annual report, publicly available 
information on each ministry website. This instrument is contained in Appendix II. 
The DCI has two main parts: NPM Index information and PPS data. For the NPM 
Index section, five key data points were calculated for each ministry: the number of 
programs, PPP programs, programs with performance measurements, the total number 
of ministry employees, and the number of contracted employees. For the PPS data 
section, all methods the ministry used in 2017 to involve the public were recorded. 
Each method's type was then determined and scored. The DCI ignored any repetition 
in each technique. For instance, if a ministry used any technique more than once, it 
was counted as one instance in the DCI. 
Data Analysis 




The Housing Ministry  
In 2010, the Saudi government created the Housing Ministry to increase the 
percentage of citizens who own shelter. In 2017, four programs contributed toward 
this goal, making beneficiaries. First, the Ready Shelter program provides shelters 
built by the ministry, with reasonable prices and low monthly payments. In 2017, this 
program provided 10,255 housing units. Second, the Developmental Housing 
Program provides shelters for poor people. In 2017 this program provided 32 shelters. 
The ministry independently runs these two programs, meaning it offered 10,287 units 
without any collaboration with the private sector in 2017. The third program, the Off-
Plan Sales Program, provides unbuilt shelters. This program allows future owners to 
choose their housing layout and location. This program provided 110,150 units in 
2017.  
Fourth, the Supported Loan Program allows citizens to obtain a real estate 
loan from any financial institution and have the ministry pay the interest rate. The 
amount of support provided is dependent on a family's size and monthly income. In 
2017, this program supported 85,000 units. The private sector contributed to 195,150 
units out of 205,437 total provided by the Ministry (95%) through these programs. 
The PPP score is 95 out of 100 (Appendix IV).  Similar to the other two 
ministries, the annual report included the output of each program. Therefore, the PM 
score is 100 out of 100 (Appendix IV). The Housing Ministry hired both merit and 
contracted employees, with contracted employees making up 52% of the almost 2000 
total employees in 2017. This gives a very high NPM Index score of 82 (Appendix 
IV). 
As with the Ministry of Commerce, the annual report for the Housing Ministry 




media, traditional media, and call centers. First, the Ministry used social media and 
short videos to inform the public about ministry programs. The Ministry’s social 
media accounts had 45,000 followers, and these accounts wrote more than 460,000 
tweets and answers. The Ministry’s social media videos were watched one million 
times. Additionally, the Ministry created a unique website, email, and contact form 
for each program. In terms of traditional media, the ministry’s staff participated in 65 
TV interviews and provided 15 workshops, which 2500 citizens participated in the 
workshops. Finally, the ministry's call center received 14,926 calls in 2017. As a 
result, the Housing Ministry has a low PPS score of 30 out of 100 (Appendix V). 
Based on PPS, the Housing Ministry obtained public feedback and consulted them. 
The Health Ministry. 
In determining the health ministry's NPM Index, PPP was established by 
examining the public and private percentages of hospital beneficiaries nationally. The 
hospital beneficiaries were calculated based on hospital beds. In 2017, the private 
sector made up 17,622 hospital beds out of 72,981 totals, or 24%.  Similar to the 
Ministry of Commerce, the annual report shows the achievements of each department 
and program. Therefore, the PM score is 100. The Health Ministry uses a contract 
system called the Autonomous Recruitment system (AR). In 2017, the Ministry had 
10,208 private contract employees out of 51,935 in the AR system, or about 20%. 
Averaging these three factors, the NPM Index score is (
24+100+20
3
) = 48 out of 100, or 
a medium level of NPM implementation (Appendix VI).   
The Health Ministry's public involvement efforts are focused primarily on an 
informal level, such as its website. Further steps included various public campaigns, 
reports, information graphics, phone medical consultations, and short videos. In the 




about its programs. Appendix I was used to calculate the PPS score. The Health 
Ministry scores low on the PPS: 26 out of 100, which means that the ministry 
included the public as consulters (Appendix VII). Furthermore, the ministry obtained 
public feedback on its programs.  
The Ministry of Commerce  
The Ministry of Commerce had 23 primary services and 52 total services 
(Annual Report, 2018). The ministry provides services for both citizens and the 
private sector. The annual ministry report did not show any collaboration with the 
private sector to deliver public services; the ministry provided all services 
independently. While the ministry did collaborate with financial institutions to change 
one regulation, this was not counted, as PPP focuses on the private sector providing 
services or support in lieu of the ministry.  
The annual report discussed several instances of collaboration with other 
ministries or global organizations. However, there were no instances of local 
cooperation with either citizens or the private sector. Therefore, the PPP score for the 
Ministry of Commerce was zero (Appendix VIII).  
As for performance measurements, the annual report included a section called 
"Achievements," which focused on the output of each program. Furthermore, the 
Annual report compared some results with the last ten years. Also, it included various 
tables and charts to simplify and summarize information for the public. Therefore, the 
ministry’s score is 100% (Appendix VIII).  
Based on the Annual Report, the Ministry of Commerce had 807 employees, 
all of whom were employed through the merit system, i.e., 0% contracted employees, 
leading to a PST of 0. The scores from each of these factors were averaged, resulting 
in the NPM Index for the Ministry of Commerce: (
0+100+0
3




This score means that the ministry has a low NPM Index. A low NPM score means 
that, in 2017, the ministry implemented high bureaucracy activities and low NPM 
activities.  
The Ministry of Commerce divides its relationship with the public into three 
components: new media, public relations, and marketing. In terms of new media, the 
Ministry completed 33 public campaigns on social media, served 20,000 beneficiaries 
through social media, and collaborated with 32 social media celebrities. Additionally, 
it created a YouTube channel to support deaf people. The ministry activities in this 
component were categorized as social media because these activities were based on 
social media, either Twitter or Youtube. Furthermore, these activities informed the 
public about ministry services. 
The public relations arm of the Ministry of Commerce facilitated a variety of 
public participation programs. Moreover, these programs were either to inform the 
public or to consult them. For instance, representatives from the Ministry gave 115 
TV and Radio interviews and published 144 newspaper comments, in addition to the 
33 public campaigns and 164 newspaper articles put out by the Ministry. They also 
created a cellphone app for the Ministry, and its call center received and answered 
1500 traditional phone calls. The marketing section of the Ministry contributed 619 
infographics, nine motion graphics, and 19 videos. The previous programs provided 
information for the public.   
The Ministry received feedback on its programs through an online feedback 
form on its main website, surveys, and email. Appendix I lists each public 
participation method that the Ministry offered. Furthermore, each technique scored 
based on SSP (Appendix I). The Ministry scored 27 out of 100, meaning it scored low 















This chapter has two primary purposes. First, it reports and discusses the 
results and the values of the variables. Second, it examines if there is a correlation 
between the variables. It also discusses the results relative to previous research.  
Results and Discussion 
Appendix X shows the ministries’ PPP, PM, PST, and NPM Index. The 
appendix X shows a significant difference in PPP scores. For instance, the Housing 
ministry had 94 points, which means that the ministry frequently collaborates with the 
private sector. On the other hand, the Commerce Ministry had no collaboration with 
the private sector, with zero points. The Health Ministry had 24 points because the 
private sector partially provides health services.  
Chapter two discussed three main reasons public organizations collaborate 
with the private sector: global institutions, governmental desire, and the revolving 
door. The first two reasons may provide a reasonable partial explanation for the 
sample because they should affect all ministries to collaborate with the private sector.  
The revolving door theory provides the best explanation by focusing on the 
individual profile for the ministers. Based on the ministers’ curriculum vitae, the 
Housing Minister had experience in the private sector, but other ministers did not. 
Another element that may explain the PPP scores is the strength of the private 
sector. For instance, the Housing Ministry collaborated with the financial sector 
because the Saudi financial sector is strong. Unfortunately, the health services private 
sector in Saudi Arabia is still weak because there is limited public health insurance 
and because the government provides free health services. Therefore, even if the 





Conversely, the PM scores for all ministries were 100. Since 2017, the Saudi 
government has required that all ministries include performance measurements in 
their annual reports. Furthermore, the Saudi government created (ADAA) to train 
public employees about performance measurements. (ADAA) does both workshops 
and training programs for public employees.  
The PST scores varied: The Housing Ministry has the highest score of 52 
points, the Commerce Ministry has the lowest score at zero points, and the Health 
Ministry had 20 points. There is no clear explanation for the difference in PST scores, 
but the appendix shows a correlation between the PST and PPP scores. Therefore, this 
dissertation assumes that increasing PPP may support public organizations to 
implement more PST. Another explanation is that novel ministries, such as the 
Housing Ministry, may need to implement the private-sector tools to attract 
employees.   
The NPM Index scores varied significantly among the ministries, with the 
Ministry of Commerce scoring the lowest at 33 points, the Housing Ministry scoring 
the highest at 82 points, and the Health Ministry falling in between at 48 points. In 
2017, the ministry of commerce implemented low NPM tools, implementing just PST, 
the tools required by the Saudi government. The Health Ministry, which had a 
medium level of NPM Index, implemented some NPM tools, but it needs to 
encourage the current tools and include missing tools. The Housing Ministry had a 
very high NPM Index score, having implemented most NPM tools. There is no 
apparent reason for the varied NPM Index score among the ministries but dealing 
with a daily base among the public may encourage the Housing Ministry to 
collaborate with the private sector and implement private-sector tools. The NPM 




In contrast, the openness scores were approximately the same for all 
ministries, tightly ranging between 25 and 30 on the PPS scale. The PPS scores were 
low, not very low. Low PPS means that the ministries provided enough information 
for the public. Furthermore, they asked for public feedback. At the same time, the 
ministries did not involve the public or collaborate with them.    
Scholars have provided two main reasons for the slight improvement in PPS in 
Saudi Arabia: the Arab Spring and social media. Some studies showed more public 
access for the ministries after the Arab Spring. Other scholars linked PPS and social 
media. For instance, the ministries’ annual reports showed that they focused on social 
media and called it the new media. 
Correlation 
The data in Appendix XI show that the implementation of NPM has had little 
or no impact on PPS in these ministries. For example, while the Ministry of 
Commerce has a low NPM Index score, it has the same PPS score as the Housing 
Ministry, which scored very high on the NPM Index. All ministries had low PPS.  
Even though the selected ministries are a small number, the researcher still 
calculated a linear regression (ŷ = 23.8165+ 0.07086X).  The coefficient is almost 
0.07, indicating that NPM implementation did not correlate with PPS or openness. 
The dissertation’s finding is significant because it emphasizes that the type of 
government affects the NPM implementations. In monarchy governments, public 









The dissertation has discussed the impact of NPM on the openness of three 
ministries in Saudi Arabia. NPM reshapes public organizations in many aspects, such 
as public-private participation (PPP) and performance measurements (PM). This 
dissertation created an NPM Index to measure the NPM implementations of the three 
Saudi ministries. It also adopted SSP to measure ministries' openness and used their 
annual reports to collect data. The findings show no correlation between NPM 
implementations and openness. The results emphasized that the government type 
affects the public sector reformation theories, such as NPM. 
This study has three main types of limitations: sample, measurements, and 
data. In Saudi Arabia, some ministries do not provide their annual reports to the 
public. Therefore, limited information affected the number of samples and how they 
were selected. First, there are 25 ministries in Saudi Arabia. This dissertation focused 
on three ministries, which is a small sample number. Second, the ministries were 
selected because they published their annual report to the public. Therefore, the 
study’s result cannot be generalized.  
Second, the researcher created the NPM index and adopted PPS. The NPM 
Index concentrates on three NPM activities: PPP, PST, and PM. These activities are 
essential, but these activities do not represent all NPM activities. Therefore, the NPM 
Index does not measure NPM implementations accurately. Additionally, the PPS 
focuses on one democratic value, openness, and did not calculate other democratic 
values, such as public accountability. The limited measurements minimize the 
findings.  
Third, this dissertation collected data from the selected ministries’ annual 




better support the findings. Furthermore, the ministries have internal departments that 
prepare and publish the annual reports, which may bias the data.  
 Future research needs to include all ministries and appropriate measurements 
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Public Participation Spectrum (PPS) 
Public Participation Spectrum (PPS) 
  
Level Inform Consult Involve Collaborate  Empower 
Description To provide the 
public with balanced 
and objective 












To work directly 
with the public 
throughout the 
process to ensure 
that public concerns 




To partner with the 
public in each aspect 
of the decision, 
including the 
development of 
alternatives and the 
identification of the 
preferred solution.  
To place final 
decision-making in 
the hands of the 
public.  
Examples Fact sheets (20). 
Websites (20). 
Open houses (20). 


































Call center (20). 
Information graphics 
(20). 






Electronic mail (40). 
Score 0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 





Data Collecting Instrument 
Data Collecting Instrument 
Ministry’s Name: 
How many programs does the ministry have?   
How many programs use PPP strategies?   
How many programs have performance measurements?   
How many employees does the ministry have?   
How many contracted employees does the ministry have?   
The NPM Index 
First factor: Public-Private Participation (PPP)   
PPP’s score = 
𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠
∗ 100   
Compute 0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 
Very Low PPP Low PPP Medium PPP High PPP Very High PPP 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
Second factor: Performance Measurement (PM)   
PM’s score= 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑀
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠
∗ 100   
Compute 0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 
Very Low PM Low PM Medium PM High PM Very High PM 
1 2 3 4 5 
     




∗ 100   
Compute 0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 
Very Low PST Low PST Medium PST High PST Very High PST 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
The NPM Index for the ministry= 
𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑃𝑀+𝑃𝑆𝑇
3
   
Compute 0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 
Very Low 
NPM 






1 2 3 4 5 
     
PPS (Lists) 
List Method Type Score 
1)     
2)     
3)     
4)     
5)     
6)     







 A Permission to use PPS 








 NPM Index score for the Saudi Housing Ministry 
NPM Index score for the Saudi Housing Ministry. 
List NPM Index Factors Score 
1 PPP 94 
2 PM 100 
3 PST 52 
The NPM Index score= 94+100+52
3







 PPS score for the Saudi Housing Ministry 
PPS score for the Saudi Housing Ministry 
Number Method Level Score 
1)  Social media Inform 20 
2)  Call center Inform 20 
3)  Short videos Inform 20 
4)  Reports Inform 20 
5)  Interviews Consult 40 
6)  Workshops Involve 60 
Total 180 







 NPM Index score for the Saudi Health Ministry 
NPM Index score for the Saudi Health Ministry. 
 List NPM Index Factors Score 
1 PPP 24 
2 PM 100 
3 PST 20 
The NPM Index score= 24+100+20
3







 PPS score for the Saudi Health Ministry 
PPS score for the Saudi Health Ministry 
Number Method Level Score 
1 Public comments Consult 40 
2 Information graphics Inform 20 
3 Website Inform 20 
4 Short videos Inform 20 
5 Reports Inform 20 
6 Phone medical consultation Inform 20 
7 Survey Consult 40 
Total 180 







 NPM Index score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce 
NPM Index score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce 
 
List NPM Index Factors Score 
1 PPP 0 
2 PM 100 
3 PST 0 
The NPM Index score= 0+100+0
3






 PPS score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce 
PPS score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce 
Number Method Level Score 
1)  Social media Inform 20 
2)  TV & Radio interviews Consult 40 
3)  Public campaign Inform 20 
4)  Newspapers comments & articles Inform 20 
5)  Cellphone App Inform 20 
6)  Call center Inform 20 
7)  Information graphics Inform 20 
8)  Website Inform 20 
9)  Online feedback form Consult 40 
10)  Survey Consult 40 
11)  Electronic mail Consult 40 
Total 300 







 PPP, PM, PST, NPM Index, and PPS scores for the Selected Ministries 
PPP, PM, PST, NPM Index, and PPS scores for the Selected Ministries 








PPP 94 24 0 
PM 100 100 100 
PST 52 20 0 
NPM Index 82 ( Very High) 48 (Medium) 33 (Low) 








 NPM Index, and PPS scores for the Selected Ministries 
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Investment
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